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NOTES
Post-Conviction Review in the Federal Courts for the Servicemember Not in Custody
Court-martial judgments have never been subject to direct review
by civilian courts.1 Like those convicted in state courts, however,
servicemembers who are "in custody" can obtain collateral review
of their convictions by petitioning for habeas corpus in the federal
courts.2 But, unlike state· courts, courts-martial frequently impose
sentences that do not satisfy the habeas "custody" requirement8-in
particular, punitive discharges, reductions in rank, and forfeitures
of pay. In response to the needs of convicted servicemembers not
sentenced to custody, the lower federal courts generally4 have begun
to review court-martial convictions collaterally in suits for mandamus,5 back pay,6 and, less frequently, declaratory and injunctive
1. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 8 (19·16);
In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900); Ex parte Valldigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243, 251,
253 (1863); W. WINTHROP, Mn.rrARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 50 (2d rev. ed. 1920), The
Supreme Court continues to ignore petitions for direct review. See, e.g., Levy v. Rcsor,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1049 (1968): United
States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied, 380 U.S. ~70 (1965). The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has disclaimed jurisdiction directly to review decisions
of the Court of Military Appeals. See Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811 (1954),
2. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973);
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950). As used in this Note, the term "federal court"
includes the Court of Claims.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 224I(c) (1970). On the "custody" requirement, see Cushman, The
"Custody" Requirement for Habeas Corpus, 50 MIL. L. REv. I (1970). The considerable relaxation of this requirement in civilian courts, see, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (habeas action lies in district other than one in
which petitioner is confined); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (habeas action
lies even if petitioner released after filing petition): Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968) (challenge to future custody); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (pcti•
tioner on parole), has not been paralleled in military cases. See, e.g., Kanewske v.
Nitze, 383 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1967) (bad-conduct discharge does not satisfy custody re•
quirement). However, there has been some indication of a loosening of requirements
and speculation that a liberalizing trend will occur. See Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and
Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. REv. I, 16-18 (1971). For a discussion of possible
expansion of the custody requirement, see text at notes 224-26 infra.
4. For exceptions, see, for example, United States v. Carney, 406 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir.
1969); Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950):
Stock v. Department of the Air Force, 186 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1950); Alley v. Chief,
Finance Center, 167 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (dictum). See also Davies v. Rcsor,
445 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1971); Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1968).
5. E.g., Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Angle v. Laird, 429 F.2d
892 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 918 (1971); Ragoni v. United States, 424
F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1970); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. cle•
nied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965). But see
United States v. Carney, 406 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1969).
6. The primary forum for back-pay suits is the Court of Claims. E.g., Augenblick
v. United States, 50~ F.2d 1157 (Ct. CI. 1975); Artis v. United States, 506 F.2d 1387
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relief.7 While the Supreme Court has long upheld the availability
of the constitutionally protected8 habeas ·writ,9 until its recent decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman10 it had expressly withheld judgment on the availability of the newer and more jurisdictionally
uncertain nonhabeas forms of review.11
(Ct. CI. 1974); Taylor v. United States, 199 Ct. CI. 171 (1972); Robb v. United States,
456 F.2d 768 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Hagarty v. United States, 449 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970); Gearinger v. United States, 412 F.2d 862 (Ct. CI. 1969).
Tucker Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970), gives district courts jurisdiction con•
current with the Court of Claims over suits against the United States where the
amount in controversy is less than $10,000. Back-pay suits in federal courts generally
have been dismissed because the amount in controversy is greater than $10,000. E.g.,
Mathis v. Laird, 483 F.2d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767,
771-72 (5th Cir. 1969). Mandamus is generally unavailable to compel the return of
back pay because an adequate legal remedy exists in the Court of Claims. Carter v.
Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1969); Parrish v. Seamans, 343 F. Supp. 1087,
1094 (D.S.C. 1972), affd., 485 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1973). But see Brown v. United States,
365 F. Supp. 328, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975) ("This Court
does not believe that it would be proper to mandamus the payment of unliquidated
or disputed sums in the nature of damages. However, this Court does believe that it
can mandamus the return of fines or forfeitures levied directly within the four comers
of an invalid judgment by a court-martial without jurisdiction.").
7. E.g., Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973), revd. on
other grounds, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966).
8. It is doubtful whether Congress could have withdrawn the privilege of babe~
corpus from those convicted by courts-martial. The Constitution provides that "[t]he
Privilege of the "Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl.
2. It has been suggested that Congress was not constitutionally required to establish
any federal habeas jurisdiction, leaving the provision of habeas review entirely to the
states. If so, the suspension clause would be read simply to protect state habeas proceedings from federal intervention. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1266-67 (1970) [hereinafter Developments]. This would
indicate that Congress could withdraw the habeas privilege from servicemembers convicted by courts-martial. Cf. Marchese v. United States, 304 F.2d 154, 156 (9th Cir.
1962) (suspension clause protects only rights of habeas as of 1789), citing Jones v.
Squier, 195 F.2d 179, 181 (9th Cir. 1952). However, the same article finds a constitutional requirement that there be some court with habeas jurisdiction over federal
prisoners, Developments, supra, at 1267, and sees merit in the argument "that once
Congress has established federal courts with the power to enforce federal law, it may
not-as a matter of due process-withhold habeas jurisdiction over federal prisoners."
Id. at 1271-72. The cases support the conclusion that the power of Congress to limit
the availability of habeas relief is narrowly prescribed. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S.
34, 48 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The mandate in Art. I, § 9, that 'The Privilege
of the Writ ••• shall not be suspended' must mean that its issuance, in a proper case
or controversy, is an implied power of any federal judge.'); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283-84, 293 (1947). See also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961).
9. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973);
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
10. 43 U.S.L.W. 4432 (U.S. March 25, 1975).
11. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Augenblick, 377 F.2.d
589 (Ct. Cl. 1967), revd., 393 U.S. 348 (1969), together with another case raising similar
issues, United States v. Juhl, 383 F:l?d 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967), revd. sub nom. United States
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Army Captain Councilman, charged with the wrongful sale,
transfer, and possession of marijuana, obtained in federal district
court a permanent injunction halting his impending court-martial
on the ground that his alleged offense was not "service-connected"
and thus not within the court-martial's subject-matter jurisdiction.12
Presumably concluding from past decisions of the United States
Court of Military Appeals (USCMA) that Councilman's jurisdictional challenge would be decided against him in the military courts,
the district court did not require the exhaustion of intra-service
remedies.13 The Supreme Court reversed, holding "that when a
v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), "because of the importance of the question con•
cerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to review judgments of courts-martial,"
393 U.S. at 349. The Court avoided the issue, however, deciding on the merits against
the servicemen after assuming, "arguendo, that a collateral attack on a court-martial
judgment may be made in the Court of Claims through a back pay suit." 393 U.S. at
351-52. In Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), the convicted serviceman
sought an order declaring his conviction invalid and requiring the Secretary of the
Navy to expunge any record of his conviction and to restore to him all pay and
benefits lost because of the conviction. Troubled by the uncertainty of the jurisdiction
of the district court, the Court asked for supplemental briefs on the issue. After reviewing the briefs-but without the benefit of oral argument-the Court decided on the
merits against the serviceman in a per curiam decision, again "[a]ssuming, arguendo,
that the District Court had jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case to review
the decision of the court-martial." 418 U.S. at 677. In support of its decision to "leave
to a future case the resolution of the jurisdictional issue," 418 U.S. at 678, the Court
cited Augenblick, indicating that it remained undecided on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. The per curiam opinion of the Court, the concurring opinion of
Justice Stewart, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall all indicated that the
Court should defer judgment on the "substantial jurisdictional issues presented." 418
U.S. at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
·
12. An offense must be "service-connected" to be within the constitutionally limited
jurisdiction of courts-martial. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969). See Relford
v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 356 (1971).
13. The district and circuit court opinions did not refer to the exhaustion issue,
even though exhaustion is clearly necessary prior to seeking collateral review of courtmartial judgments. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950), See Noyd v. Bond,
395 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1969). Presumably the courts agreed with decisions based on
virtually identical facts holding that exhaustion is unnecessary when there is little
chance that the servicemember's jurisdictional challenge will succeed in the military
courts. E.g., Chastain v. Slay, 365 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo. 1973) (citing the district
court's opinion in Councilman as dispositive); Holder v. Richardson, 364 F. Supp, 1207
(D.D.C. 1973); Redmond v. Warner, 355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973). Accord, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 43 U.SL.W. 4432, 4440-41 (U.S. March 25, 1975) (Brennan, J,,
joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., concurring and dissenting). Cf. DeChamplain v,
McLucas, 367 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated, 43 U,S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April
15, 1975); Wishmeyer v. Bolton, 361 F, Supp. 629 (N.D. Fla. 1973), vacated mem., 498
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1974). By the time the Supreme Court decided Councilman, however,
the weight of lower court authority was that exhaustion is necessary even if apparently
futile, in light of the need to respect the orderly processes of the military court system,
the desire to avoid needless friction, and the appropriateness of having facts developed
and law interpreted "by the expert adjudicatory tribunals charged in the first instance
with responsibility for offenses of members of the armed services." Scott v. Schlesinger,
498 F.2d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 506 F.2d
1250 (8th Cir. 1974); Dooley v. Ploger, 491 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1974); Sedivy v. Richardson, 485 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1973); Locks v. Laird, 441 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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serviceman charged with crimes by military authorities can show
no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his case in the
military court system, the federal district courts must refrain from
intervention, by way of injunction or otherwise."14
While Councilman involved an attack on a pending court-martial
proceeding rather than an action for post-conviction review, much
of the Court's discussion of the relations between military and federal courts applies in the post-conviction context as well. Moreover,
the Court construed the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
provision that makes "final" all court-martial judgments15 as not
precluding federal court jurisdiction in suits for nonhabeas postconviction review-th~reby eliminating one longstanding obs(acle
to such review-and implied that in certain circumstances nonhabeas
review would be appropriate.16 Nevertheless, considerable uncertafnty still surrounds the availability
scope of nonhabeas review,
stemming principally from the lack of a specific statutory basis for
such review17 and the traditional policy, strongly reaffirmed in
Councilman,18 of nonintervention by civilian courts in military
justice proceedings.19

and

404 U.S. 986 (1971); Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S.
335 (1970).
14. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4438-39. Accord, McLucas v. DeChamplain, 43 U.S.L.W. 4453,
4457 (U.S. April 15, 1975).
15. UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970). See note 54 infra.
16. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4434-37. The Court's discussion of article 76 can perhaps be
viewed as dictum since the Court could have reversed on the exhaustion issue without
determining whether article 76 precluded all nonhabeas relief. 13ecause the Court had
refused to construe article 76 in several earlier cases, however, see note 11 supra, it
may have been interested in finally resolving the issue.
17. The statutes providing jurisdiction for nonhabeas review do not mention courtsmartial. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to entertain back-pay suits is based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II, 1972), granting that court general jursidiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States and, since 1972, the power, incidental to granting a money judgment, to "issue orders directing restoration to office
or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of
applicable records." Mandamus jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), granting district courts "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plaintiff." Declaratory relief is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1970) and FED. R. Crv. P. 57, but must be supported by an independent jurisdictional
basis. See text at notes 163-70 infra.
18. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4435, 4437-39.
19. See Hiatt v. 13rown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). Substantive military law developed separately from
civilian law, Noyd v. 13ond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969), with the Supreme Court playing
no role in its development and exercising little supervisory power over the congressionally established courts enforcing it. 13urns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). See Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974): "This Court has long recognized that the military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized
that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own
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This Note examines the availability of nonhabeas federal court
review for those convicted by courts-martial. Part I discusses the
function of such review and suggests a scope of review that would
serve that function without unduly burdening the federal courts;
Part II sketches the evolution of nonhabeas review and analyzes the
jurisdictional problems surrounding its present status; Part III recommends statutory and judicial changes to make the review of courtsmartial more equitable and efficient.
I. THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL COURT REVIEW
Commentators have debated the need for federal court review of
court-martial proceedings,20 disagreeing on the merits of opposing
policy considerations and, in particular, on the relative effectiveness
of military and civilian courts in protecting individual rights. 21 On
during its long history." A separate court-martial system existed prior to the adoption
of the Constitution and was continued in existence by the first Congress in I 789, Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95 (providing that the Army should continue to be governed by the existing articles of war). See W. WINTHROP, supra note I, at 47-48. "It is
substantially correct to state that in all countries of which we have knowlcdge--ancient
and modem-the existence of a standing army has been accompanied by the provision
for the government of that army under a separate code of military law, administered
through special courts." c. BRAND, ROMAN MILITARY LAW x (1968). As a result of this
separate development, only in the past two decades has it seemed legitimate to com•
pare military with civilian justice. Compare United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A, 74, 77
1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951) (due process rights of servicemembcrs based not on the Consti•
tution, but on laws enacted by Congress), and Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 147 (1953)
(Minton, J., concurring) (due process of law for military personnel is what Congress
has provided for them), with United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A, 629, 634, 37
C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967) (safeguards of the Constitution apply to military trials except
in so far as they are made inapplicable either expressly or by necessary implication),
and Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970) (military rulings on constitutional issues must conform
to Supreme Court standards unless it is shown that conditions peculiar to military
life require a different rule).
20. See, e.g., Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of
Court-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 40 (1961); Burris &: Jones, Civilian Courts
and Courts-Martial-The Civilian Attorney's Perspective, IO Al>t. CRlllt. L. REv. 139
(1971); Ellis, Court of Claims Jurisdiction To Review Court-Martial Convictions, 24
JAG J. 47 (1969); Katz&: Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 193 (1966); McCormack, Federal Court Intervention in Military Courts
-Interrelationship of Defenses and Comity, 6 GA. L. REv. 532 (1972); Sherman, Judicial
Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55
VA. L. REv. 483 (1969); Weckstein,.supra note 3; Comment, Federal Court Review of
Decisions of Military Tribunals, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 569 (1971).
The desired scope of federal court review of state criminal proceedings has also
been debated. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945 (1964); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attach on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 142 (1970); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961).
21. Compare Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3
(1970), with Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a
Civilian Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REv. 105 (1970), for evaluations by two of the most
capable scholars of military jurisprudence of the relative effectiveness of military and
civil courts in protecting individual constitutional rights. See also J. BISHOP, JUSTICE
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one side it is argued that there is little need for federal court review,
because Congress and the President-to whom the Constitution has
committed the government of the armed forces 22-have provided
code of military justice23 and a procedural manual24 ihat balance the
rights of the individual against the requirements of national defense
and that generally have been administered so as to safeguard the
rights of the accused. In addition, this argument continues, a need
exists for military autonomy in decisions involving uniquely military
considerations. Civilian judges are unfamiliar with the distinctive
purposes and problems of military law, and thus are unable to appreciate the requirements of morale and discipline that the military
justice system must take into account.
·

a

UNDER FIRE (1974), reviewed, Sherman, 84 YALE L.J. 373 (1974); Kent, Practical Benefits
for the Accused-A Case Comparison of the United States Civilian and Military Systems of Justice, 9 DUQUESNE L. R.Ev. 186 (1970); Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice,
12 WM. &: MARY L. R.Ev. 482 (1971); Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial
and Civilian Practice, 15 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1240 (1968), reprinted in 46 MIL. L. R.Ev. 77
(1969); Schiesser&: Benson, Modern Military Justice, 19 CAmouc U. L. R.Ev. 489 (1970);
Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and _Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49
!ND. L.J. 539 (1974); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev.
181 (1962).
22. ''The Congress shall have Power •.• To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces ••••" U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. "The
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I. Investing express control of courtsmartial in Congress rather than the President was a conscious decision of the framers
of the Constitution-a response to the problems of Parliament in seventeenth-century
England in restraining the King's asserted independent prerogative to try soldiers by
court-martial in time of peace. Article 9, § 4, of the Articles of Confederation-from
which the present clause was taken-was even more explicit: "The United States, in
Congress assembled, shall .•• have the sole and exclusive right and power of • • •
making rules for the government and regulation of the . . • land and naval forces,
and directing their operations." See 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 330 (1911); THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (A. Hamilton); J. TANNER,
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 62, 225 (student ed.
1971). Congress also has other broad military powers: "To raise and support Armies,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; "To provide and maintain a Navy," cl. 13; "To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union," cl. 15; "To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of
'them as may be employed in the Service of the United States," cl. 16.
23. The present system of Inilitary justice is set forth in the 140 articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), enacted on May 5, 1950, and codified as
IO U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).
24. Pursuant to authority delegated by article 36 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836
(1970), the President has promulgated the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), the most
recent version of whiclI was prescribed in 1969 by Exec. Order No. 11476, 3 C.F.R. 132
(Comp. 1969). As an executive order the Manual has the force of law, although provisions inconsistent with the UCMJ are unauthorized and thus invalid. The MCM
implements the UCMJ, prescribing military justice procedures, rules of evidence, and
maximum punishments. The Service Secretaries have liinited authority to issue regulations to carry out their responsibilities of ensuring the preparedness and effectiveness of the armed forces. See, e.g., IO U.S.C. § 3012 (1970) (Army). These regulations
also have the force and effect of law. Cf. United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. 291 (1842).
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On the other side it is argued that the military justice system
remains an imperfect guarantor of servicemembers' rights, subject
in particular to excessive influence by military commanders. Recent
improvements in military justice have not reduced constitutional
misinterpretations to the point where federal court review is superfluous, but instead have served principally to reduce the disruptive
effect of such review. The best guarantee of fundamental fairness in
military proceedings is the existence of a supervisory authority wholly
independent of the military. Because of their special competence,
federal courts should retain the ultimate authority to decide questions of constitutional law. With the enormous growth of the military
in this century, the expanded number of "civilian soldiers," and the
intermingling of civilian and military societies20-witness the scattering of military bases throughout the country and the expanded
resort to off-base housing26-it is no longer true that the armed
forces constitute an isolated community requiring an autonomous
system of justice. Civilian courts can adequately consider the special
needs of the military when interpreting the UCMJ, which is no
more complex or specialized than other statutory schemes administered by federal courts.
Recent Supreme Court decisions do not resolve this debate; they
contain little discussion of the reasons for and proper scope of federal court review of military proceedings.27 In Burns v. Wilson,28
25. See Warren, supra note 21, at 188: "When the authority of the military has
such a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating
the military establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts
almost inevitably is drawn into question."
26. See Sherman, 49 IND. L.J. 539, supra note 21, at 572.
27. Prior to World War II it was clear that federal court review was to be limited
narrowly. Federal courts were willing to examine only (1) whether the court-martial
had jurisdiction over the servicemember, see, e.g., Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
331 (1806), and the offense, see, e.g., Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); (2) whether
the sentence was within authorized limits, see, e.g., Carter v, McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365
(1902), and properly approved, see, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893):
United States v. Page, 137 U.S. 673 (1891); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887);
and (3) whether the court-martial was convened, constituted, and conducted according
to applicable statutes and regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240
(1907); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S.
553 (1897); Johnson v •. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240
(1891).

.

Federal courts uniformly refused to question the mode of conducting the trial, the
admissibility of evidence, and matters left to the discretion of the military court or
,judge. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 23 (1946); Mullan v. United States, 212
U.S. 516 (1909); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 561 (1897); Keyes v. United
States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883). In Swaim, for instance, the Court refused to consider the
qualifications of the judge advocate advising the court, questions of evidence admis•
sibility, whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, and whether the
court-martial abused its discretion in overruling a challenge of the qualifications of
a court member.
Alleged constitutional errors in court-martial proceedings were not reviewed by
federal courts prior to World War ll, although the few cases reaching the Supreme
Court in which such errors were raised are not sufficiently clear or numerous to deter•
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the Court indicated that the £unction of federal court review, at
least in habeas corpus actions, is to determine only whether courtsmartial act ·within their personal and subject matter jurisdiction and
give "fair consideration" to all allegations of constitutional error,29
rather than to ensure error-free court-martial proceedings. Subsequently, in United States v. Augenblick,30 a back-pay suit brought
in the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court suggested that federal
court review might extend to all constitutional error, whether or not
the military courts considered it, but cautioned that "apart from
trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a
constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and
safeguards are so relaxed or forgotten ... that the proceeding is more
a spectacle ... or trial by ordeal ... than a disciplined contest." 31
In Parker v. Levy,32 a 1974 decision, the Court cited Burns as
the prevailing standard without discussing the impact of A ugenblick.88 Moreover, the opinion in Councilman suggests that the range
of issues cognizable in collateral actions is perhaps even more restricted than under the Burns test. At one point the Court stated
that court-martial judgments can be attacked only for "lack of
jurisdiction or some other equally fundamental defect." 34 At another
point, the Court declared that "the·question whether a court-martial
judgment properly may be deemed void-i.e., without res judicata
effect for purposes of the matter at hand-may turn on the nature
of the alleged defect, and the gravity of the harm from which relief
is sought," and that "both factors must be assessed in light of the
deference that should be accorded the judgments of the carefully
designed military justice system established by Congress."35 Signifimine whether the Court was disinterested because of the assumed inapplicability of
the Bill of Rights to the military or because of limitations on the scope of review.
See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 116
(1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886). The expansion of the scope of review
in civilian habeas corpus cases to include review of constitutional errors, see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), led six circuits in the 1940's to conclude that
military habeas corpus should be similarly expanded. See Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d
645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 874 (1949); Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1948), revd. sub nom. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); Benjamin v. Hunter,
169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948); Wroblewski v. Mdnerney, 166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948);
United States ex Tel. Weintraub v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1948); United States
ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664: (3d Cir. 1944); Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th
Cir. 1943).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality opinion).
346 U.S. at 144.
393 U.S. 348 (1969).
393 U.S. at 356.
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
417 U.S. at 762,
43 U.S.L.W. at 4435.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4437.
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cantly, in commenting on the scope of review, the Court turned not
to Burns, which the lower courts had for two decades viewed as the
leading precedent,36 but to three earlier decisions that had restricted
federal court ·scrutiny to the sole issue of the court-martial's personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction.37
The proper scope of federal court review of courts-martial thus
has not been consistently or clearly articulated by the Supreme
Court. The Court recognized in Councilman that Congress has some
leeway in establishing the scope of federal court review of courtsmartial,38 however, and it is therefore appropriate to consider the
substance and legislative history of relevant provisions of the UCMJ.
During the drafting of the UCMJ there was significant discussion
about the role of· civilian judges in the administration of military
justice.89 Direct federal court review of court-martial convictions on
questions of law was proposed as a means of assuring fairness in
court-martial proceedings.40 The principal objection to this proposal
was that federal courts might improperly weigh the requirements of
military discipline and morale in construing substantive and procedural military law.41 Due process for military personnel differs
from that accorded civilians,42 and while Congress was unwilling
36. See generally H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 6-320 to -344 (19'72) (includes a circuit-by-circuit analysis of the lower court interpretations of Burns). See also
text at note 59 infra.
37. 43 U.SL.W. at 4435. The Court cited Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, Ill (1950),
which quoted In re Grimley, 13'7 U.S. 14'7, 150 (1890) ("The single inquiry, the test,
is jurisdiction."). Also cited was Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886) ("[T]he
general rule [is] that the acts of a court-martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction
and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civilian courts.') In Coundlman the
Court stated that it had "adhered uniformly" to this general rule. 43 U.S.L.W. at
4435.
38. 43 U.S.L.W. at 443'7.
39. See Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation
and Future, 55 MIL. L. REv. 39, 51-'71 (1972).
40. See 96 CONG. REc. 1302, 1304 (1950) (remarks of Senator Tobey); Hearings on
R.R. 2775 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2084 (1947); Hearings on S. 857 and R.R. 4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 157, 161, 238 (1949) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings]. See generally W. GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES 34-53 (19'73).
41. Hearings on R.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 778-81, 794-96 (1949) (testimony of Frederick Wiener)
[hereinafter House Hearings]; Senate Hearings, supra note 40, at 259-60 (testimony of
Major General Green, Judge Advocate General of the Army). The House Subcommittee
was warned that the proposed civilian appellate court would cause delay in the administration of military justice, thereby endangering the security of the nation, House
Hearings, supra, at 772-73, and that civilian review of courts-martial would interfere
with the performance of the military. Id. at 778-806.
42. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 147 (1953) (Minton, J., concurring); Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911); United States v. Clay, I U.S.C.M.A. 74, 77, I C.M.R.
74, 77 (1951). For an examination of the historical relationship between military personnel and the Constitution, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 7I HARV. L. REv. 293 (1957) (the Bill of Rights applies except
for grand jury and petty jury rights). Henderson's thesis was successfully disproved
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to let military judges alone decide where the differences should lie,
it was equally unwilling to give federal judges, with widely varying
knowledge of military affairs, an unfettered hand in that determination. 48 The compromise was to establish a Court of Military
Appeals composed of three presidentially appointed44 civilians, "completely removed from all military influence or persuasion." 45 According to the House Committee Report, this court was designed to be
"the court of last resort for court-martial cases, except for the constitutional right of habeas corpus."46 Intermediate appellate courtsnow known as the Courts of Military Review-also were established,
with both military and civilian members.47 The military appellate
system was to supervise the administration of military justice48 and
"insure public confidence in the fairness of military justice."49
From this legislative history it is clear that Congress intended that
the primary civilian influence on military justice be provided by
the United States Court of Military Appeals (USCMA) and the
several Courts of Military Review. These courts were to interpret
the UCMJ and determine where the line should be drawn between
individual rights and military needs-a role they have pursued
by massive documentation and persuasive argument in Wiener, Courts-Martial and the
Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1958), and Weiner, CourtsMartial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72 HARV. L. REv. 166 (1958)
(the Bill of Rights was not intended to apply and did not apply in courts-martial).
It remains true today that the Bill of Rights does not protect servicem.embers to the
same extent that it protects civilians. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), criticized
in Sherman, 49 IND. L. REv. 539, supra note 21, at 569-73 (1974). The Court stated in
Parker that "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity
for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which
would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." 417 U.S. at 758 (referring to first
amendment protections). See Note, A Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Under
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Jmtice, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1431, 1437-43
(1974).
43. Willis, supra note 39, at 65-70. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)
("the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment").
44. UCMJ art. 67, IO U.S.C. § 867 (1970).
45. H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
46. H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 45, at 7. See also 95 CONG. R.Ec. 5721 (1949) (remarks of Representative Brooks). One of the principal drafters of the UCMJ, discussing the Court of Military Appeals, explained in committee hearings that "there is
still a way to go to the Supreme Court of the United States, actually, and that is by
habeas corpus." Home Hearings, supra note 41, at 1277-78.
47. UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970).
48. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969) ("When after the Second World War,
Congress became convinced of the need to assure direct civilian review over military
justice, it deliberately chose to confide this power to a specialized Court of Military
Appeals, so that disinterested civilian judges could gain over time a fully developed
understanding of the distinctive problems and legal traditions of the Armed Forces.").
49, 96 (:oNG. REc. 1363 (1950) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
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actively,50 although not without criticism.51 Federal court review
extending to all questions of law, or perhaps even solely to constitutional issues, would conflict with this congressional policy decision,
since· such review would necessarily entail independent judgments
on the proper balance between individual rights and military needs.
A more restricted federal court review, however, arguably is not
inconsistent with this policy. Review to determine whether a courtmartial had jurisdiction over the servicemember and the offense
would involve little of the balancing function that Congress vested
in the military appellate courts. The same may be said of review for
clear violations of constitutional provisions that apply to the military
under decisions of the Supreme Court or the USCMA, at least where
the military tribunals manifestly have failed to consider the alleged
errors.
It is true that when Congress creates a right and provides a
remedy, the remedy normally will be viewed as exclusive,112 suggesting that violations of the court-martial defendant's statutory rights
should be rectifiable only by the intra-service review authorities
established to protect those rights. But, since constitutional rights
and limitations on the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of
·courts-martial53 are not congressionally created, this principle would
not preclude challenges based on such grounds.
Also significant in determining the proper relationship between
military and federal courts is article 76 of the UCMJ: "[T]he proceedings, :findings, and sentences of courts-martial . . . and all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences by
courts-martial ... are final and conclusive ... [and] binding upon all
50. See Sherman, Justice in the Military, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 21, 28 CT,
Finn ed. 1971); Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of Military Appeals
and the Future, 57 Mn.. L. REv. 27 (1972). Justice Douglas has noted that the USCM'A
"has at least been partially successful in infusing civilian notions of due process into
the military justice system." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 52 n.4 (1972) (concurring
opinion) (citing cases).
51. E.g., Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rigl1ts,
22 HAsrlNGS L.J. 325, 373 (1971). Cf. R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUsrICE Is TO JUSTICE As
Mn.rrARY Musrc Is TO MUSIC (1970).
52. Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 608 (1959); Switchmen's Union of N. Am.
v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940); United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919).
According to Justice Douglas, at least, this is true only when the body providing the
remedy is neutral on the issue. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 470 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (by implication). On
the other hand, where a statutory right is created without a specified remedy, there
is a strong inference that judicial action is not precluded. Switchmen's Union of N.
Am. v. National Mediation Bel., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943) (dictum). See Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies."); Harmon v. Brucker,
_355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958).
53. See note 83 infra.
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departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States."54
While Councilman decided that article 76 does not entirely preclude nonhabeas review, 55 the Court stated that the provision "is
highly relevant to the proper scope of collateral attack on courtmartial convictions and to the propriety of equitable intervention
into pending court-martial proceedings."56 Absent a more explicit
interpretation by the Court, however, it is difficult to conclude from
article 76 anything beyond the fact that Congress did not desire significant federal court intervention into military justice proceedings.
What, then, is the proper role of federal courts in the administration of military justice? Clearly, Congress and the Supreme Court
have rejected the position that the purpose of federal court review
is to ensure error-free court-martial proceedings.57 Furthermore, if
even a small percentage of the servicemembers convicted by courtsmartial could obtain federal court review of all errors of law, federal
courts would be significantly burdened.58 A more plausible position
is that review should be available for all constitutional issues, a
position several courts have adopted by construing the Burns "fair
consideration" language to mean that courts-martial must correctly
resolve constitutional issues before federal court review is precluded.59 Councilman does not clearly rule out this stance, for
54. Article 76 reads in full:
The appellate review of records of trial provided by this chapter, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed
as required by this chapter, and all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial following approval, review, or affirmation
as required by this chapter, are final and conclusive. Orders publishing the proceedings of courts-martial and all action taken pursuant to those proceedings are
binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States,
subject only to action upon a petition for a new trial as provided in section 873
of this title [article 73) and to action by the Secretary concerned as provided in
section 874 of this title [article 74], and.the authority of the Presi<lent.
.
.- __ .
10 u.s.c. § 876 (1970).
55. 43 U.SL.W. at 4436-37.
56. 43 U.SL.W. at 4434.
57. See text at notes 28-37, 39-51 supra.
58. In fiscal year 1972 the Army alone, with an average personnel strength of under
1 million, tried 31,587 persons by courts-martial. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT
OF l\:III.ITARY APPEALS 16 (1972) (Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Army)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. During the same period the Navy conducted 21,977
courts-martial, id. at 30 (Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy), and the
Air Force 2,661. Id. at 32 (Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force).
One reason for the large number of trials is that the UCMJ regulates aspects of
the conduct of servicemembers that in the civilian sf>here are left unregulated, and
imposes sentences that include forms of administrative discipline below the threshold
of civilian criminal sanctions. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749-50 (1974).
59. See, e.g., Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gallagher v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970); Kauffman v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970), CJ.
Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
But see Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942
(1973); Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 33~ (10th Cir. 1967) (relief unavailable if
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arguably constitutional error is a defect as "fundamental" as lack
of jurisdiction.00 With review of this scope, federal courts would
retain· the ultimate authority to deal with "the nice subtleties of
constitutional law" that arise in courts-martial. 61
Several factors undercut the attractiveness of this position. First,
the decision of many constitutional questions faced by courts-martial
requires a delicate balancing of individual rights against military
needs..:......a balancing task for which Congress created the specialized
military appellate courts. 62 If federal courts were to defer to USCMA
precedent on constitutional issues whose resolution requires special
knowledge of the military environment, review of all constitutional
error might be feasible without undue federal court intervention.
Expecting federal courts to defer to military courts on constitutional
issues, however, is unrealistic in light of past practices. 63 In addition,
a scope of review differentiating between issues that require military
expertise and those that do not would be difficult to devise and
even more difficult to apply. Second, even with review limited to
constitutional error, federal courts might be heavily burdened by
relief petitions, particularly in districts with major military installations. The large number of habeas petitions from those convicted in
state -courts 64 suggests that allegations of constitutional error are
easily made. Third, it is often difficult to determine whether facts
stated in a complaint amount to constitutional error when a servicemember alleges that the cumulative effect of numerous errors of
law is a denial of due process. In sum, the burden on federal courts,
as well as the extent of their intrusion into military affairs, might
not be significantly less if they reviewed all constitutional issues
than if they reviewed all questions of law.
-As an alternative, federal court review could be limited to a
military courts gave constitutional issues full and fair consideration, even though their
conclusions were erroneous). A circuit-by-circuit analysis of the scope of federal court
review is presented in H. MOYER, supra note 36, §§ 6-320 to -344.
60. See text at note 34 supra.
61. The opinion of Justice Brennan in Councilman stated: "It is virtually hornbook
law that 'courts-martial as an institution arc singularly inept in dealing with the nice
subtleties of constitutional law.' " 43 U.S.L.W. at 4440-41 (Brennan, Douglas &: Marshall,
JJ., concurring and dissenting), quoting O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
The majority, however, thought othenvise: "[I]t must be assumed that the military
court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4438.
62. See text at notes 44-51 supra.
63. Cf. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 795 (3d Cir. 1973), revd., 417 U.S. 773 (1974);
Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829, 832 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972): McCahill v. Eason, 361 F, Supp.
588, 589_ (N.D. Fla. 1973); Redmond v. Warner, 355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973).
64, See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 n.14 (1973) (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J. &: Rehnquist, J., concurring); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus:
A _Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. R.Ev. 321 (1973); Weick, Apportionment of the
Judicial Resources in Criminal CaSes: Should Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated1, 21 DE
.PAULL. R.Ev. 740 (1972). But cf. Developments, supra note 8, at 1041-42.
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determination whether the court-martial had jurisdiction m~er the
person and the offense. Since few servicemembers could make even
a colorable claim that courts-martial had erred in this regard, the
burden on federal courts would be slight. This would, however,
leave courts-martial entirely free from federal court scrutiny in the
vast majority of cases. While the prospect of subsequent review
probably does not prevent military judges from deciding constitutional questions incorrectly, it surely reduces the number of instances
where such questions are not even given fair consideration. Moreover, limiting review to jurisdictional issues would exempt all substantive and procedural military law from constitutional challenge
in federal courts.
·
It is possible to formulate an intermediate scope of review that
encourages courts-martial to provide fair procedures without usurping their responsibility to decide federal claims arising in the military setting. Federal court review, under this standard, should· be
available only where (1) the jurisdiction of the court-martial system
over the servicemember or the offense is challenged; 65 • (2) military
substantive or procedural statutes or regulations are constitutionally
challenged; or (3) either the military has failed to give alleged ~onstitutional · errors consideration that is reasonable66 in light of
the gravity of the sentence and of the alleged error, or constitutional
error is claimed on the. basis of facts outside the record that were
unavailable for consideration on direct appeal.
.
Keeping courts-martial within their constitutionally limited jurisdiction is the most important and least intrusive function f~deraJ
courts can perform. In addition, review of the UCMJ and the
Manual for Courts-Martial for constitutionality retains the function
of article III courts as the final arbiters Qf federal legislation without
intruding into court-martial decisions of law or fact. The third
prong of the proposed review standard _is similar to the Burns "fair
consideration" test. 67 Like Councilman, however, it recognizes that
65. The personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of the court-martial system is
constitutionally limited. See note 83 infra. The three types of courts-martial-summary, special, and general-also have statutory jurisdictional limits on the offenses
they may consider and the severity of the sentences they may impose. See UCMJ arts.
16-20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-20 (1970). The proposed standard limits federal court review
to constitutional violations.
66. Federal courts should have the power to overturn military court decisions based
on manifestly incorrect interpretations of the Constitution. If such power were expressly conferred in the review standard, however, federal courts could too easily expand the standard to all constitutional error by loosely construing ~e phrase
"manifestly incorrect." The standar$1 therefore has been drafted more narrowly than
it is intended to operate in practice. In the rare instance in which the military court's
resolution of a cons_titutional issue is indeed manifestly incorrect, the federal court
will be able to reverse by finding, somewhat disingenuously, that the military court's
"consideration" was not "reasonable."
67. See text at note 29 supra. While the burden on federal courts under the proposed standard will be less than it would be if all allegatic;ins of constitutional error
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the scope of review should vary with the gravity of the alleged error
and of the court-martial sentence.68 Thus, close military court
scrutiny of alleged serious constitutional error should be required
before federal courts uphold the imposition of severe sanctions.
"Reasonable" consideration rather than "fair" consideration is required in the proposed standard to make clear that federal courts
should intervene only when military courts pay inadequate attention
to constitutional issues, and not when their deliberations simply
result in incorrect decisions.69 The trial record or appellate court
were reviewed, the occasions for federal court review still will be numerous, Relatively
few court-martial convictions are reviewed by the competent military appellate courts,
During fiscal year 1972 there were 56,873 court-martial cases in all branches of the
armed forces. During that period the Courts of Military Review considered 6,203 cases
(10.9% of that total) and the USCMA rendered opinions in 129 cases (.23% of that
total). ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 4, 8-11. Convictions of general or flag offi•
cers; convictions that result in sentences of at least one year of confinement, death, or
punitive discharge; and convictions of commissioned officers, cadets, or midshipmen
that result in discharge receive automatic appellate consideration by the several courts
of military review. The USCMA must hear all cases in which the sentence affects a
general or flag officer or extends to death, plus all cases reviewed by a Court of
Military Review that the Judge Advocate General orders sent to the USCMA for review. It has discretion to hear all other cases reviewed by the Courts of Military Review. UCMJ arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-67 (1970), Sentences that do not warrant
review by the Courts of Military Review are reviewed administratively on a nonad•
versarial basis by members of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, usually with
no possible route to the appellate courts. See UCMJ arts. 60-65, 69, 10 U.S.C, §§ 860-65,
869 (1970); MCM, supra note 24, ,i,i 84-91, 103. While the exact procedure in cases not
reviewed by·a Court of Military Review depends on the type of court-martial and the
severity of the sentence, at most the UCMJ requires review by the authority convening
the court-martial (or his successor in office) based on the written opinion of his staff
judge advocate or legal officer, and by the Office of the Judge Advocate General. For
a summary, see United States v. Snyder, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 481-82, 40 C.M.R, 192,
193-94 (1969).
Although federal courts perhaps may safely defer to the judgment of the USCMA
on constitutional issues, cases not reviewed by that tribunal often are made "final" by
article 76 without scrutiny by judges experienced in constitutional law. Cf. O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969): "While the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some constitutional rights of the accused who are court-martialed, courts•
martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law."
Many have viewed federal court review of state court proceedings as unnecessary
where the issues have been fully and fairly considered by a state appellate tribunal,
See, e.g., Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 289 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("One con•
sidered appeal is enough, in the absence of factors which show a possibility that a
substantial injustice has been inflicted on the defendant."); Friendly, supra note 20, at
165 n.125 ("[I]f I were to rely solely on my limited experience, I would think tl1e
case for the final federal say has been considerably exaggerated•••• My observation of
the work of [state courts in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont] ••• does not suggest that federal determination of [constitutional] questions is notably better, • , • In
the few [cases] where we disagree, I feel no assurance that the federal determination
is superior.''). The principles of federalism that underlie this view are inapplicable to
the military-federal court relationship. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 51 (1972) (Doug•
las, J., concurring); Noyd v. :Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969).
68. See text at note 35 supra.
69. But see note 66 supra,
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decision should in most cases reveal whether the issue was considered adequately, thus facilitating the screening of petitions. This
review standard does not eliminate the need to determine whether
error is constitutional nor preclude the necessity of federal court
balancing of individual rights and military needs. It does, however,
reduce the number of instances in which either is necessary.
Despite numerous suits for collateral review of courts-martial,
it remains unclear whether the scope of review in nonhabeas actions
is the same as that in habeas actions. The Supreme Court's only
suggestion on this issue is its ambiguous statement in Councilman
that the "grounds for impeachmen,t cognizable in habeas proceedings
may not be sufficient to warrant other forms of collateral relief.'.' 70
This statement seems reasonable if it means that the scope of federal
court review should to some degree tum on the gravity of the courtmartial sentence. This policy is not implemented, however, by automatically granting a greater scope of review to those seeking release
from custody than to those seeking other relief. While civilian courts
rely almost entirely on imprisonment to punish serious offenders,
courts-martial frequently impose serious sanctions, such as punitive
discharges, forfeitures of pay, fines, and reductions in rank, that do
not constitute "custody" for the purpose of obtaining a writ of
habeas corpus. Most severe is generally the punitive discharge, concerning which the court in Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force
stated: "[T]he deprivation of liberty under an invalid conviction is
a grievous injury, but a military discharge under other than honorable conditions imposes a lifelong disability of greater consequence
for persons unlawfully convicted by courts martial." 71 In addition
to terminating his career and depriving him of government benefits,72 a punitive discharge "stigmatizes the serviceman's reputation,
impedes his ability to gain employment and is in life, if not in law,
prima facie evidence against the serviceman's character, patriotism
or loyalty.''73 Thus, whether a servicemember is in custody for habeas
corpus purposes is often unrelated to the severity of his sentence
70. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4437.
71. 415 F.2d 991, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 1013 (1970).
72. Under 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1970) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (1974), a discharge under
dishonorable conditions bars the receipt of any veterans' benefits. A bad-conduct discharge ordered by a general court-martial also terminates benefits automatically. 38
U.S.C. § 3103 (1970), 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(2) (1974). A bad-conduct discharge awarded
by a special court-martial bars receipt of benefits only if awarded for the reasons
contained in 38 U.S.C. § 3103 (1970) and 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12(c), (d) (1974). For the differences between the jurisdiction of general and special courts-martial, see UCMJ arts.
18-19, IO U.S.C. §§ 818-19 (1970).
73. Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "In terms of its effects
on reputation, the stigma experienced by the recipient of a discharge under other than
honorable conditions is very akin to the concept of infamy ••••" Everett, Military Administmtive Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J. 41, 50.
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and to the burden of the continuing disabilities he faces.74 While
making the standard of collateral review depend on whether the
defendant seeks a release from custody as opposed to other relief is
probably not so arbitrary as to deny equal protection,70 it is a pro74. This point has been relied upon heavily by many -0f the courts expanding nonhabeas review. See, e.g., Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Kauff•
man v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1013 (1970); Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Jones v. United States, 419 U.S. 907 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Often quoted is the rationale of the
Court of Claims in Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 592 (1967), revd. on
other grounds, 393 U.S. 348 (1968):
There is no adequate reason for looking to habeas corpus alone, or for thinking that Congress limited its exception from "finality" to that specific proceed•
ing. Liberty is of course important, but so are a man's career, his livelihood, his
rights as a veteran, his status as a convicted criminal, and his reputation. To deny
collateral attack to one not in confinement-the consequence of saying that habeas
corpus is the only remedy-would be to deny the possibility of review by a constitutional court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court, of the consl!tutional
claims of servicemen like plaintiff who have not been sentenced to jail or who
have been released.
On the effect of discharges other than honorable, see Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Lunding, ]udidal Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 YALE L.J. 33 (1973).
75. The degree of scrutiny to which this classification would be subjected is unclear. If minimal scrutiny is employed, the classification probably would survive because personal physical liberty in general is arguably more important than the
monetary loss or public obloquy that results from a conviction. If stricter scrutiny
is employed, the classification may not survive if challenged by a servicemember sentenced to a punitive discharge who had no opportunity to request habeas review, for
his situation is in no significant respect distinguishable from a servicemember sentenced to a short imprisonment term.
In determining what level of scrutiny is appropriate it is significant that for due
process and equal protection purposes the Court bas found differences between the
trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding and between an appeal of right
and a discretionary appeal. The scrutiny of classifications apparently becomes less
rigorous as the defendant exhausts his review possibilities. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 610-12 (1974). Collateral attacks, occurring after the exhaustion of intra-service
appeals, are more akin to discretionary appeals than to appeals of right. A classification upon which the scope of collateral review is based accordingly should be subjected
to less scrutiny than a similar classification at trial or on direct appeal. Compare, e.g.,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (appointment of counsel for indigent state
defendant required on first appeal of right), with Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(counsel for indigent need not be appointed for discretionary appeal to state supreme
court and application for certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court). Cf. Gallagher v. Quinn,
363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966) (statute conditioning mandatory USCMA review of court-martial judgment on whether servicemember is a general
or flag officer upheld against equal protection attack). It also should be noted that
deferen~ to the military apparently has lessened the Court's equal protection scrutiny of classifications in the military setting. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 43 U.S.L.W.
4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975). ,
In light of the constitutional protection of the writ of habeas corpus, see note 8
supra, and the lack of corresponding protection of an avenue of collateral review for
those not in custody, a distinction in terms of scope of review between those seeking
habeas and nonhabeas relief arguably is constitutionally created. To say that the distinction in this setting violates equal protection, however, is not tantamount to saying that the equal protection clause impliedly repeals the suspension clause, The
suspension clause requires that collateral review be available to those in custody. If
a class of people is placed in a situation indistinguishable from or more severe than
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cedure difficult to justify in view of the relative needs of servicemembers and the function of federal court review.

II.

JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR FEDERAL COURT REVIEW

Despite the arguments against conditioning federal court review
on whether a servicemember seeks a release from custody, the availability of nonhabeas post-conviction relief remains uncertain .even
after Councilman. The problem that had most troubled lower federal courts, however-the effect of the article 76 finality provision76
custody in practical effect, the equal protection clause requires that they be treated
similarly and accorded review of the same scope and availability. The equal protection issue has apparently been mentioned only in Jones v. United States, 419 U.S. 907,
910 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
To the extent that the scope of collateral review is intended to reflect the seriousness of the penalty imposed, a distinction based on whether a servicemember seeks a
release from custody as opposed to nonhabeas relief also may be attacked as a conclusive presumption that sentences involving custody are more serious than other sentences. That presumption is "not necessarily or universally true in fact," and hence
arguably violates the due process clause. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632, 644 (1974), quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). The scope of the
conclusive presumption doctrine is unclear, however, and the doctrine is subject to
serious theoretical and practical criticisms. See Note, The Conclusive Presumption
Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800 (1974). Assuming
that the doctrine has continued vitality, its most· reasonable limitation would be to
cases involving "burdens that wor[k] a particular hardship on the individuals involved," id. at 830, a limitation that seems clearly to cover the servicemember sentenced to a punitive discharge.
76. See note 54 supra. The USCMA, established by Congress as the "final interpreter"
of the UCMJ, S. REP. No. 806, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967), generally has viewed article
76 as determining the cutoff point for review within the military, prohibiting the Courts
of Military Review and the USCMA from examining alleged errors in cases beyond the
explicit statutory scope of their jurisdictions on direct review. See, e.g., Allen v. United
States, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 288, 289, 45 C.M.R. 62, 63 (1972); Platt v. United States, 21
U.S.C.M.A 496, 497, 45 C.M.R. 271, 272 (1972). The USCMA has provided little insight
into the effect ~f article 76 on federal court jurisdiction, for it is hard to conceive of a
setting in which it would be presented with the issue. Generally, however, the USCMA
has viewed federal court review as a fait accompli, an· undesirable consequence flowing
from the failure of military courts to face "squarely'' all of the constitutional issues
in the cases before them. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 642-43, 37 C.M.R.
249, 263-64 (1967) (Kilday, J., concurring). Judge Kilday cited four recent nonhabeas
collateral attack decisions supporting this proposition: Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir.
1965); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949 {CL CI. 1966); Shapiro v. United States, 69
F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
In United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 151, 36 C.M.R. 306, 307 (1966),
the court declared that article 76
does not insulate a conviction from subsequent attack in an appropriate forum.
At best it provides finality only as to interpretations of military law by this
Court.••• [Article 76] has never been held to bar review of a court-martial,
when fundamental questions of jurisdiction are involved. See, Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 [1953]; Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 [CL Cl. 1947]; Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 [D. Utah 1965]. As the Supreme Court of the
United States observed in a related case, a finality clause of the kind in question
describes the normal "terminal point for proceedings within the court-martial
system" Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132 [1950].
By citing Shapiro, a Court of Claims case, the court recognized that a suit for back
pay is at least one means of nonhabcas federal court review not precluded by article
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-was removed when the Court in Councilman concluded that that
provision did not entirely foreclose nonhabeas review. 77
The Court easily could have reached the opposite conclusion
by viewing article 76 as an exercise by Congress of its power to insulate courts-martial from federal court scrutiny. Congress has the
power to curtail the jurisdiction of inferior article III courts78 because it was required by the Constitution neither to create them70
nor to invest them, if created, with all of the jurisdiction authorized
to them by article III.so On several occasions Congress has withdrawn
76. But the context in which this was stated involved a successful attempt by the
USCMA to expand its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970),
with no issue of federal court review involved. Accordingly, Frischholt. cannot be
viewed as an authoritative interpretation of the effect of article 76 on federal court
jurisdiction, particularly since the expansion of nonhabeas review predominantly oc•
curred subsequent to that decision. Earlier, in United States v. Armbruster, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414 (1960), the USCMA stated that its determinations were final "subject only to review by the Supreme Court on constitutional is•
sues ...."

The court in Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 508
F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975), gave article 76 a reading similar to that of the Supreme Court
in Councilman:
The provisions of § 876 embodied a concept of legal finality, and must be read to
encompass the normal collateral exceptions to such finality. One of those excep•
tions is and has always been that complete lack of jurisdiction in the narrow
sense may be raised in any available proceedings. • • • [l]f Congress had wished
to eliminate this by 10 U.S.C. § 876, and thereby put a punitively discharged or
unincarcerated person convicted by an illegally convened authority on such a
radically different footing than a person "in custody," the Court feels it would
have said so more clearly and directly.
365 F. Supp. at 335-36.
77. See text at note 55 supra.
78. "Simply stated, Congress may impart as much or as little of the judicial powct
as it deems appropriate and the Judiciary may not thereafter on its own motion recur
to the Article III storehouse for additional jurisdiction. When it comes to jurisdic•
tion of the federal courts, truly, to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth, and
the Congress taketh away." Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities
v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973). See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
551 (1962); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n,l
(1799). But see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) ("Congress simply lacks the
constitutional power to insulate states from attack with respect to alleged deprivations
of individual constitutional rights.'). Cf. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F,2d
254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948). Eisenberg, Congressional Authority To Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532-33 (1974), concludes that Congress cannot
withdraw federal jurisdiction to hear cases in which constitutional rights arc at stake
or to grant constitutionally required remedies. In the author's view this follows from
the conclusion that Congress could not abolish the lower federal courts. See id, at
504-13. The author states that "[i]t may well suffice to provide an appeal to a subordinate federal court from state courts [on constitutional issues], as long as such forums
are generally available." Id. at 533.
79. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (plurality opinion); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
233-34 (1922); 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at 118, 124-25 (1911). But see Eisenberg,
supra note 78, at 504-13, where it is asserted that the existence of lower federal courts
in some form is constitutionally required.
80. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Justice Story's opinion in
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jurisdiction from federal courts over certain classes of cases.81 Moreover, in aid of the powers enumerated in articles I and IV, Congress
may establish various legislative courts,82 such as courts-martial,.83
with the power to hear certain cases within the article III "judicial
power" that would othenvise be cognizable by article III courts. 84
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), suggests the contrary, but in
his later opinion in White v. Fenner, 1 Mason 520 (No. 17,547) (C.C.R.I. 1818), he held
that the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts is statutorily limited, and that Congress
need not extend their jurisdiction to the full scope of the judicial power as defined
in article III, § 2. The article III, § 2, grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in cases
arising under the laws of the United States thus is not self-executing, and the fact that
a case arises under federal law does not mean that an inferior article III court has
jurisdiction over it. Boyk v. Mitchell, 312 F. Supp. 934, 937 (N.D. Ohio 1969), a[fd.,
425 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1970).
The question whether Congress may extend the jurisdiction of article III courts
beyond the judicial power as defined in § 2 has been answered in the negative. Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities
v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973).
81. See, e.g., the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) (restricting power
of United States courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes); 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970)
(limiting federal court power to enjoin or restrain assessment or collection oJ state
taxes); 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1970) (limiting federal court jurisdiction to entertain suits to
restrain assessment or collection of federal taxes). See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943); Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
82. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (art. I courts established to
govern the District of Columbia); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)
(Court of Customs Appeals set up under the authority of art. I, § 8, cl. 1, empowering
Congress to make laws necessary and proper to aid in the collection of import duties);
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular court); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (territorial courts).
83. The system of military justice was established pursuant to U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 14, granting Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," and the other enumerated military powers.
Courts-martial are thus under the control of the political branches of government,
deriving their power and jurisdiction from a source independent of article III of the
Constitution. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 237, 247 (1960); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); Tarble's Case, 80"
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 408 (1871); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79, 82 (1858); W.
WINTHROP, supra note I, at 79. To end any remaining doubts, Congress amended the
UCMJ in 1968 to provide that the Court of Military Appeals was "established under
article I of the Constitution of the United States." Act of June 15, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-340, § 1, 82 Stat. 178, amending UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970). Congress is
limited in the jurisdiction it can constitutionally vest in courts established under U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Thus, limits exist on the personal jurisdiction of courts-martial. See, e.g., McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian employee· not triable
for noncapital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(dependents of servicemembers not triable for noncapital offense); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957) (civilians may not be court-martialed in · time of peace). The subjectmatter jurisdiction of courts-martial is limited to "service-connected" offenses. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
84. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-45, 549 (1962); Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 567 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). It
has been well established that the Constitution does not require every question arising
under federal law to be tried in an article III court. E.g., Palmore v. United .States,
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Inferior federal courts may constitutionally be denied jurisdiction
to intervene in such cases provided that the legislative courts' pro•
cedures meet due process standards.sr;
The Court correctly concluded, however, that the few scattered
references bearing on the issue in the legislative history of article 76
were insufficient to evidence an "affirmative intent" on behalf of
Congress to limit federal court review to habeas corpus cases. 86 In
the first place, there was considerable precedent for nonhabeas review of a narrow scope81 when Congress enacted the finality provision in 1948, although such precedent was not mentioned in the
congressional history. Civil trespass and related actions had been
maintained in the nineteenth century against officials who executed
court-martial sentences, and in deciding whether to award damages
courts had examined the validity of the underlying convictions. 88
It is perhaps understandable that this precedent was overlooked, for
by the twentieth century tort law had granted immunity to officers
executing facially valid judgments, virtually closing this avenue of
411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973). Courts established under other constitutional provisions, as
well as state courts, see, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947), have been relied
upon by Congress to hear federal question cases.
85. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944); Hart, supra note 81, at
1367-70, 1387-401. Actions in legislative courts are not reviewable by federal courts
if they are not within the judicial power as defined by article III, see, e.g., Federal
Radio Commn. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Ex parte Bakelite Corp,, 279
U.S. 438 (1929); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923), because article
III is a constitutional limit on federal court jurisdiction. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Hodgson&: Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303
(1809). But see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600
(1949) (plurality opinion).
Federal courts have intervened in court-martial proceedings in a few instances upon
a showing that the procedure violated due process, e.g., Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp.
495 (C.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Midden•
dorf v. Henry, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (No. 74-175) (injunction entered against all Marine
Corps summary courts-martial where no counsel provided at pre-trial stage), or that
the statute under which the petitioner was charged was unconstitutional on its face.
E.g., Mccahill v. Eason, 361 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (pre-trial habeas corpus writ
issued because of unconstitutionality of article 134 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970)).
But see Locks v. Laird, 441 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971) (ex•
haustion of intra-service remedies required before petitioner may challenge regulation
in federal court). Such intervention is rarely appropriate, however, for the defendant
does not often challenge military judicial procedures as facially invalid. Exhaustion
is required when the defendant alleges that the procedure is unconstitutional only as
applied to him. See, e.g., Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (allega•
tions of command influence, prejudicial pre-trial publicity).
86. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4436-37.
87. All federal court review of court-martial convictions, including habeas corpus
review, was of a narrow scope prior to 1948. See note 27 supra.
88. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (false imprisonment and
assault and battery); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (replevin); Houston
v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) (trespass); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331
(1806).
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review. 89 A precedent of continuing validity, however, was the action
in the Court of Claims for pay and allowances forfeited by courtmartial sentences.90 This action also required decisions on the validity of underlying court-martial convictions. Furthermore, while no
federal court asserted the power to review court-martial judgments
in suits for injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief, such review
was available with respect to military administrative actions; 91 it was
not clear that court-martial convictions could not have been similarly
reviewed. 92
Perhaps Congress failed to discuss these avenues of nonhabeas
review because of language in a prominent 1946 Supreme Court case,
In re Yamashita: 93 "[T]he military tribunals which Congress has
sanctioned by the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and
judgments are made subject to review by this Court.... Congress conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations save
as it has granted judicial power 'to grant writs of habeas corpus for
the purpose of an inquiry ·into the cause of restraint of liberty.' " 94
This declaration ignored the above precedents, however, and~ having
been uttered in a habeas corpus action, should have been discounted
as dictum. Another possible reason for Congress' omission is that,
89. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 25, at 127-29, § 132 (4th ed.
1971): REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 122-24, 145, 266 (1965); Weckstein, ~pra
note 3, at 14.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907); Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897); Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883); Shapiro v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
.
91. The plaip.tiff in Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539 (1947), challenged his administrative discharge in a suit requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. In Denby v.
l3erry, 263 U.S. 29 (1923), mandamus was allowed to review an order of the Secretary
of the Navy directing the release of the plaintiff from active duty in the Navy.
In United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922), and a companion
case, United States ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922), mandamus relief was
requested in suits to review the actions of a military administrative classification
board. In both cases the Court stated simply that the relief was unavailable where
the military tribunal was lawfully constituted and acting within its jurisdiction.
92. In Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 570 (1885), the Court stated that it was not
"authorized to interfere with [a naval court-martial] in the performance of its duty,
by way of a writ of prohibition or any order of that nature." l3ut the Court a year
later deemed the availability of such a writ an issue of first impression, denying the
rvrit on the merits without deciding the jurisdictional issue. Smith v. Whitney, 116
U.S. 167 (1886). The issue has remained unresolved. See Chavez v. Ferguson, 266 F.
Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967), appeal dismissed as moot, 395 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Maney, 61 F. 140 (C.Cn. Minn. 1894). Mandamus relief was requested
in Carter v. Woodring, 92 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 752 (1937), but
was denied on the merits.
93. 327 U.S. 1, 8, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 452 (1940), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1970).
94. The Court made a similarly broad statement in another habeas corpus action,
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132 (1950): "[Military tribunals] have operated in a
sell-sufficient system, save only as habeas corpus was available to test their jurisdiction
in specific cases."
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while these actions decided the validity of court-martial convictions, the convictions were not actually overturned when relief was
granted.95 This explanation seems unlikely, however, because habeas
corpus relief at that time96 also did not disturb the court-martial
judgment, being limited to release from custody.97 Yet Congress
made -several references to the continued availability of habeas
corpus relief in the legislative history of article 76.98
Congress also failed to mention the power of the Boards for
Correction of Military Records, established by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,99 to recommend the correction of military
records when "necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice."100
A 1947 Opinion of the Attorney General had affirmed that this
power extended to court-martial sentences.101 The power of the
Service Secretaries to grant clemency on the Boards' recommendations102 also went unmentioned. While the fact that none of these
avenues of nonhabeas review were cited in the legislative history of
article 76 weakens their importance as indicators of congressional
intent, it is also unlikely that Congress meant to foreclose their use
without discussion.
95. See Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806) (trespass). Not until 1972
could the Court of Claims "issue orders directing restoration to office or position,
placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records." 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II, 1972).
96. Habeas relief today may be accompanied by orders declaring the conviction
void and restoring "[a]U rights, privileges and property of which the petitioner bas
or would be deprived by virtue of the judgment of the court and execution of the
sentence adjudged at that court-martial." Wishmeyer v. Bolton, 361 F. Supp. 629, 630
(N.D. Fla. 1973), vacated mem., 498 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1974). See Fay v. Noia, 872 U.S.
391, 469 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Such orders are needed because the disabilities
of a conviction extend beyond release from confinement. Cf. Carafas v. LaVallee, 891
U.S. 234 (1968).
97. See Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 570 (1885).
98. See House Hearings, supra note 41, at 799; H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 45,
at 7 (Court of Military Appeals is to be "the court of last resort for court-martial
cases, except for the constitutional right of habeas corpus"). Senator Kefauver, dis•
cussing article 76, pointed out that "Congress, through its enactment, did not, and
could not, ••• intend to take away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of other
courts in habeas corpus matters." 96 CONG. R.Ec. 1414 (1950).
99. 60 Stat. 837 (1940), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970).
100. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970). The provision states that the Secretary of each military
department, acting through civilian boards, may correct any military record of that
department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice,
Congress intended these Boards to eliminate the earlier necessity for aggrieved military
personnel to seek private legislative bills for relief. Since the remedial purpose of this
legislation was to accord the kind of relief that Congress could have given directly in
an individual case, the power of the Boards has been broadly construed to provide
potential relief notwithstanding the "finality" or conclusiveness of the decisions of
other military authorities. Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1969), va,
cated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 335 (1970).
101, 40 OP. ATIY. GEN, 504, 509 (1947).
102. 10 u.s.c. § 1552 (1970).
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Two further reasons, not suggested in Councilman, support a
reading of article 76 not to preclude nonhabeas review. First, a wellrecognized canon of statutory construction provides that statutes
should be read so as to avoid constitutional issues.103 Were article
76 construed to bar nonhabeas review, constitutional and other federal issues arising in court-martial cases not reviewable by habeas
corpus would be entirely cut off from Supreme Court appellate
scrutiny.104 While it seems clear that Congress can deny jurisdiction
over these issues to inferior federal tribunals,1° 5 less clear is Congress'
power to except from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
cases within the article III, section 2, definition ·of the judicial
power,1° 6 such as cases arising in courts-martial.107 This potential
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974); United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
104. Direct appeal on certiorari to federal courts is unavailable. See note 1 supra
and accompanying text.
_
105. See text at notes 78-81 supra. The Constitution does not require· that every
federal question, including criminal prosecutions· for violating Acts of Congress, be
tried in an article m court. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973). To the
extent courts-martial are viewed as administrative bodies rather than as legislative
courts, however, the result may be different. As Justice Douglas has pointed out,
"[w]hether the Constitution permits Congress to forbid an Art. III court to review
constitutional challenge to administrative penalties is a question the Court has not
addressed explicitly." Jones v. United States, 419 U.S. 907, 910 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Court has on several occasions suggested
that the complete preclusion of judicial review of administrative action raises constitutional issues. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974); Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946). See also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concuning); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
284-85 (1922).
106. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution, Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922), although subject to "such

Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art.
ill, § 2. The "exceptions and regulations" clause appears to leave little room for disputing the power of Congress to divest the Court of its commission to review certain
types or classes of cases, and the Court has on one occasion recognized this power. See
Ex parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). In United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128 (1872), the Court confronted the issue wbether Congress could cut off
all access from the Court of Claims, then considered an article I co~rt, to the Supreme
Court. While holding on the facts that Congress did not properly cut off the right of
appeal, the Court indicated that Congress had the ability to do so in exercise of its
power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 145. Other than in these dated cases, however, the scope of the congressional
power to limit the Court's jurisdiction has been only scantily ·explored, usually in
casual dicta. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472-73 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1881); Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-21 (1847);
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796).
Numerous commentators have offered constructions of the "exceptions and regulations" clause that seriously limit Congress' power, and that, applied · to the courtmartial setting, would cast constitutional doubts on the total preclusion of nonhabeas
review. It has been suggested, for example, that any case "excepted" from the Supreme Court's appellate review must be included within its original jurisdiction, Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 32-33; that the
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constitutional difficulty cautions against reading article 76 to preclude nonhabeas review.
Second, construing article 76 to allow nonhabeas review would
accord with the interpretation of finality provisions in administrative
law.108 As Professor Davis has stated, "the most striking feature of
the law of reviewability is the unreliability of the literal words of
statutes, no matter how clear and unequivocal."100 Thus, even in the
face of explicit finality language, courts generally review administrative action to determine whether it exceeds the agency's jurisdiction
or lacks a basis in fact. 110 In addition, courts will almost always
clause was meant only to permit restriction of the Court's review of questions of fact,
not of substantive constitutional matters, R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT
285-96 (1969); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical
Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); that no matter how broad the general scope of legislative authority under article III, its exercise is limited by other constitutional provisions that may themselves condemn certain denials of Supreme Court review to
particular classes of persons, Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parle Mccardle,
15 ARlz. L. REv. 229, 263-69 (1973); and that if a case is "excepted" from the Court's
appellate purview, then jurisdiction over it must be vested in a lower federal court
and some path must remain to permit the constitutional questions it raises to reacl1
the Supreme Court, I w. CROSSKEY, PoLmcs AND THE CONSTirUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 610-18 (1953).
107. Military courts handle cases that in a literal sense arise under the laws of the
United States, and that presumably could be added by Congress to the jurisdiction of
article III courts. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that cases arising under
laws passed by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive legislative power over the Dis•
trict of Columbia, see U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, come within the judicial power of
article III courts. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 368 (1974). Congress, how•
ever, has chosen to make such suits cognizable by article I rather than article III courts.
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973). Presumably cases arising under
laws passed pursuant to the congressional military power fall in the same category.
108. In the administrative law area, courts generally have required clear evidence
of legislative intent to preclude judicial review before that conclusion will be in•
£erred. See Tooalmippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 606 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 166 (1970); City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164 (1969); Ab·
bott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424
F.2d 331, 334-35 (3d Cir. 1970).
109. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.01, at 2 (1958). Professor Davis
goes on to state: "When statutes are silent concerning judicial review, as many arc,
the administrative action is sometimes reviewable, and sometimes not. When statutes
provide that the administrative action 'shall be final,' the action is sometimes review•
able and sometimes not. When statutes provide that the action 'shall not be re•
viewed,' the action is sometimes reviewed and sometimes not." Id. at 2-3 (footnotes
omitted).
110. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), the Supreme Court faced a
provision making final the decisions of local Selective Service boards. The Court in•
terpreted the provision to mean that finality attached only when the boards acted
within their respective jurisdictions. The decisions of local boards made in conformity
to regulations were thus final even through erroneous. But where a decision had no
basis in fact, the question of jurisdiction was reached, and federal courts had the
power to intervene. The plaintiff in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), received
administratively a less than honorable military discllarge and sought judicial review
of the Army Review Board's refusal to change it. A provision made the actions of
that Board final, subject only to review by the Secretary of the Army. "Generally,"
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rectify clear statutory violations,111 and constitutional challenges to
the statute under which administrative action is taken are not
precluded by provisions making final all action taken under the
statute.112 In short, finality provisions typically have not been construed to cut off all judicial review.113
The administrative law analogy is appropriate because courtsmartial, like administrative agencies, differ from ordinary courts,
although not in the same respects. First, courts-martial are ad hoc
tribunals set up to hear specific cases.114 Second, they lack regularly
assigned judges, and may even be convened without any legally
trained officers.115 Third, review of the vast majority of court-martial
judgments is ex parte, in contrast to the adversarial nature of prothe Court stated, "judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act
of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers." 355 U.S.
at 581-82. Despite the finality provision, if a federal court construing the statutes involved determines that the official had exceeded his powers, "his actions would not
constitute exercises of his administrative discretion and judicial review from this illegality would be available." 355 U.S. at 582.
Ill. The plaintiff in Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968), sought
pre-induction review of his draft classification, but faced a statute providing that "there
shall be no pre-induction judicial review of the classification or processing of any
registrant." Apparently the plaintiffs only means of obtaining judicial review was by
suing for a writ of habeas corpus after induction or defending a criminal prosecution
for failure to submit to induction. The Court allowed the action, however, stating
that to preclude pre-induction judicial review in the instance of a clear statutory violation by the local board would be "to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness."
393 U.S. at 238-39. Accord, Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973): "There is,
however, a very strong court created exception to [jurisdiction] withdrawal statutes.
This exception comes into play when there has been a clear departure from statutory
authority."
112. In Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974), the plaintiff was allowed to
challenge certain provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Act despite a provision stating
that "the decision of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration ••• shall be 1inal and conclusive and
no ••• court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision ••••" 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970). For a critique of this decision, see Rabin,
Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Pmcessing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A.
Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN'. L. REv. 905, 907-ll (1975).
113. But see Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), which read the provision making final all deportation orders of the Attorney General as limiting review to habeas
corpus. The Court relied heavily upon the long history of limiting judicial review to
habeas corpus in the deportation area. Importantly, the Court's reading merely limited the timing of review, for habeas corpus was available at some point to all deported aliens. The reading was thus in accordance with the expressed congressional
desire to minimize repetitious litigation.
114. Cf. UCMJ arts. 22-24, IO U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1970). The three types of courtsmartial-general, special, and summary-differ significantly in the formality of the
trial proceedings and the thoroughness of review. Generally, the more serious the substantive offense, the more procedural safeguards protect the accused servicemember
and, presumably, the less likely prejudicial error is to go undetected. See UCMJ arts.
16-20, 25-27, 32-34, 38, 54, 65-67, 10 u.s.c. §§ 816-20, 825-27, 832-34, 838, 854, 865-67
(1970); H. MoYER, supra note 36, at §§ 2-300 to -678; Moyer, supra note 21; Sherman,
22 MAINE L. R.Ev. 3, supra note 21, at 59-103.
115. UCMJ art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970); MCM, supra note 24, ,r 4.
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ceeclings before civilian appellate tribunals. 116 Each of these factors
justifies a broad construction of the :finality language in article 76.
Assuming that article 76 does not bar federal court jurisdiction
over suits seeking nonhabeas review of court-martial convictions,
the plaintiff must still find a positive statutory basis for the exercise
of such jurisdiction. The several bases plaintiffs might advance in
this regard can best be examined from a historical perspective.
Prior to 1965, most courts passing on suits for nonhabeas relief paid
little attention.to article 76 or to other specific jurisdictional issues.117
In 1950 the District of Columbia118 and Fourth Circuits119 concluded
summarily that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over nonhabeas
actions. A district court in 1958 read article 76 to preclude nonhabeas review, but offered no reasons for so holding.129 On the other
116. See H. MOYER, supra note 36, at §§ 2-750 to -767.
117. Although the Supreme Court mentioned article 76 several times in reviewing
habeas proceedings, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); Gusik v. Schilder,
340 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1950), it had no occasion to consider the provision's impact on
federal court jurisdiction over actions for nonhabeas relief. In Gusik, the Supreme
Court held that habeas corpus actions were not barred by article 76, opaquely reading
the provision "as doing no more than describing the terminal point for proceedings
within the court martial system." 340 U.S. at 132. The habeas corpus writ was dis•
charged in Gusik because the allegations did not rise to a constitutional level.
118. See Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950). The
court in Goldstein was faced with a request for a declaratory judgment and a man•
datory injunction to set aside a court-martial proceeding. Allegedly the court-martial
and its subsequent review were part of a fraudulent conspiracy to cover up adminis•
trative errors and the appellant was deprived of his right to civilian counsel of his
own choice, contrary to the Articles of War, and denied an opportunity to introduce
certain evidence in his behalf because the court-martial tribunal wrongfully refused
to grant a continuance. Appellant's charges were of a constitutional nature and did
not challenge the jurisdiction of the court-martial or the propriety of its convening or
constitution. Four months earlier the Supreme Court had indicated in Hiatt v. Brown,
339 U.S. 103 (1950), that constitutional error not going to the court-martial's jurisdiction in the traditional sense would not be rectified by federal courts. The Goldstein
court thus could have dismissed the action on the ground that the alleged error was
not within its scope of review. Perhaps the court had this in mind, but it went further and stated explicitly that in the absence of physical confinement, a prerequisite
for habeas corpus relief, it was without power to interfere with or in any way review
court-martial proceedings. An earlier district court decision, Brown v. Royall, 81 F.
Supp. 767 (D.D.C.), afjd., (D.C. Cir. 1949) (unreported), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952 (1950),
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a request for declaratory and injunctive relief in
which the convicted serviceman alleged that the court-martial that convicted him was
without personal jurisdiction. The district court noted that to its knowledge no civil
court had undertaken to pass upon the validity of a court-martial in a declaratory
judgment proceeding. 81 F. Supp. at 768.
119. Stock v. Department of the Air Force, 186 F.2d 968 (1950).
120. Alley v. Chief, Finance Center, 167 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (dictum). The
action was interpreted as requesting mandamus relief and thus was properly dismissed, since federal courts outside of the District of Columbia were unable to grant
such relief until 1962. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Accord, Harris v. United States, 204
F. Supp. 228, 230 (D. Mass.), affd., 308 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1962). The court in Hooper
v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437, 441-42 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd., 274 F.2d 429 (9th Cir.
1959), concluded that a declaratory judgment was unavailable to a serviceman who
had not exhausted his intra-service remedies.
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hand, the Court of Claims consistently assumed jurisdiction over
back-pay suits, without mentioning article 76.121 In 1957 a District
of Columbia district court held that it could review court-martial
convictions in suits requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, but
cited no supporting authority and failed to mention article 76 or
the contrary 1950 decisions.122 In response to the defendant's jurisdictional challenge, the court stated that while it could not review
the decisions of courts-martial acting within their jurisdiction, it
"unquestionably" had the duty in any collateral proceeding to determine the underlying jurisdictional facts.123
The first reasoned assertion of jurisdiction over nonhabeas suits
occurred in 1965 in Ashe v. McNamara,124 when the First Circuit
determined that federal courts could mandamus the several Boards
for Correction of Military Records to rectify the breach of a plain
duty to grant relief. The _Correction Boards, with the approval of
the Service Secretaries, change records of servicemembers convicted
by courts-martial-most frequently changing punitive discharges to
honorable discharges. Their actions are thus implicit exceptions to
article 76.125 Since actions of the Boards are reviewable by federal
courts126 and mandamus is appropriate to compel them to grant
121. See, e.g., Griffiths v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 691 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 865 (1959); Ktivoski v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 954 (1956); Fly v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 440 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Sima v. United
States, 96 F. Supp. 932 (Ct. Cl. 1~51).
_
.
_
122. Jackson v. Wilson, 147 F. Supp. 296, 297-98 (1957). The court denied the defendant's motions to dismiss and to grant summary judgment, concluding that there
was a genuine issue as to the facts underlying the court-martial's jurisdiction. Although
relief eventually was denied, see Jackson v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958),
the court specifically upheld its jurisdiction to investigate the plaintiff's allegations
that the court-martial that convicted him had been improperly convened and constituted, In neither decision did the court state what general jurisdictional statute
applied or in what manner the plaintiff had satisfied any jurisdictional amount requirement.
123. 147 F. Supp. at 298.
124. 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965). The district court interpreted the suit as a request for a declaratory judgment. Quoting article 76, the court stated it had no power
to inquire into the jurisdiction of a court-martial in a declaratory judgment action,
and thus dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Ashe v. McNamara, 243 F. Supp. 243, 244
(D. Mass.), revd., 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
125. It is not completely clear in light of article 76 that the Boards can review the
actions of courts-martial. An early Attorney General's Opinion concluded that unless
this power did exist, the purpose of the act establishing the Boards-to relieve Congress of the burden of considering private bills for relief-would not be adequately
fulfilled. 41 OP. ATTY. GEN. 4 (1949). Most courts have concluded that the Boards do
have this power. E.g., Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1970); Smith
v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 899 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Ashe
v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 282 (1st Cir. 1965). See Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1971). But see Parrish v. Seamans, 343 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D.S.C. 1972),
afjd., 485 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1973) ("This court is not impressed with the argument
that the finality provision of Article 76 was modified by 10 U.S.C. § 1552.'').
126. See Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 280-81 (1st Cir. 1965); Jones, Jurisdiction
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relief, the Ashe court held that mandamus could be used to review
court-martial convictions indirectly.
The use of mandamus made by Ashe has become a well-accepted
means of reviewing ·court-martial convictions.127 Recently, a second
use of mandamus was attempted. In Brown v. United States128 the
Third Circuit faced a class-action suit by servicemembers seeking a
mandamus writ ordering the Secretary of the Navy to expunge their
co1,1rt-martial convictions and return all forfeited pay and allowances.
Although it denied relief on the merits, the district court in a
lengthy opinion upheld the jurisdiction of federal courts to order
military officials to exercise their clemency powers120 to expunge
convictions and to return liquidated amounts of fines and forfeitures.130 On appeal, the government conceded federal court jurisdiction under the Tucker Act131 for claims against the government of
less than $10,000 (in this case, the claims for fines and forfeited pay
and allowances), but argued that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to order the grant of clemency by mandamus. In response,
the Third Circuit stated: "Since the government concedes that there
is Tucker Act jurisdiction . . . we must reach the merits of the
appeal in any case. As a result, since we ultimately reject the plaintiffs' underlying cause of action, there is no need to finally decide
whether mandamus jurisdiction exists since a decision on this question would do no more than expand or narrow the remedies available to the plaintiffs if they prevailed on the merits." 132
of the Federal Courts To Review the Character of Military Administrative Discharges,
57 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 917, 967-69 (1957).
127. See, e.g., Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Angle v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 918 (1971); Ragoni
v. United States, 424 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1970); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1973), afjd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975); Williams v. Froehlke, 356 F. Supp.
591 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afjd., 490 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974); Lima v. Secretary of the Army,
314 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1970). But cf. Parrish v. Seamans, 343 F, Supp. 1087 (D.S.C.
1972), afjd., 485 F.2d 571 (4tli C!r. 1973).
128. 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975). Accord Lebron v. United States Secretary of the
Air Force, 392 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 392 F. Supp.
428 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
129. See, e.g., IO U.S.C. § 1552 (1970) (Service Secretary "may correct any record
when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice"): UCMJ art.
64, IO U.S.C. § 864 (1970) (convening authority may reduce sentence to what "he in
his discretion determines should be approved'}
130. 365 F. Supp. 328, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1973), afjd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975) ("To
hold that mandamus to the Board is the only action over which this Court has jurisdiction, exhaustion aside, would unnecessarily tie the hands of the Federal Courts and
is not a construction of the statute which should be adopted absent the clearest expression of congressional purpose. Such mandamus is only a thinly veiled use of the
mandamus power to examine court-martial proceedings in any event.').
· 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). See note 6 supra.
132. 508 F.2d at 619 n.l.
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The mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, provides the servicemember with a cause of action and the federal courts with jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy.188 There-are three
limitations on its use in obtaining nonhabeas collateral review, however. First, under traditional principles mandamus is available only
when a manifestly nondiscretionary duty is owed the plaintiff, a
duty "so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt." 184 The Correction Boards, against whom mandamus suits are typically brought,
have broad discretion to recommend mitigation of court-martial
sentences,185 since their function is not to provide direct review of
court-martial convictions but rather to determine whether servicemembers are entitled to clemency relief comparable to, and in lieu
of, private acts of Congress to correct military records.186 Rarely
133. The statute states in full: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or an agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Prior to
the enactment of the statute in 1962, only the federal courts in the District of Columbia possessed mandamus power. The statute generally has been viewed as conferring
similar jurisdiction on the other federal courts, and not as extending the scope of
mandamus relief or creating new causes of action against the United States or its
officials. See, e.g., White v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. Administration, 343 F.2d 444,
447 (9th Cir. 1965); Massachusetts v. Connor, 248 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Mass.), afjd.,
366 F.2d 278 (1st Cir. 1966); Dover Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Jones, 227 F. Supp. 88, 90
(D.N.H. 1963): Seebach v. Cullen, 224 F. Supp. 15, 17 (N.D. Cal. 1963), afjd., 338 F.2d
663 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965).
134. Keeny v. Secretary of the Army, 437 F.2d 1151 (8th Cir. 1971). Accord, Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1972) (en bane);· United States v.
Walker, 409 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1969); Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of
Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1966). Mandamus is available to rectify abuse
of discretion, Duffy v. Dier, 465 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969) (when official conduct has gone "far beyond any ra•
tional exercise of discretion"), and to compel the exercise of discretion by an officer
who has erroneously considered himself to lack it, United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d
303, 305 (2d Cir. 1966), but not to direct the manner in which discretionary acts are
performed or to influence the exercise of discretion. National Indian Youth Council
v. Bruce, 485 F.2d 97, 100 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 946 (1974); McQueary
v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir. 1971).
135. See text at note 100 supra.
136. Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d
618 (3d Cir. 1975); 41 OP. AnY. GEN. 4 (1949); 40 OP. AnY. GEN. 504, 508 (1947);
Developments, supra note 8, at 1237. The Boards are not courts, are not necessarily
composed of lawyers, and have little expertise in deciding legal issues. See United
States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 412 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (4th Cir. 1969); Brown v. United
States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1973), afjd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975); Letter
from Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records to the Michigan Law Review,
Feb. 27, 1975; Letter from Army Board for Correction of Military Records to the
Michigan Law Review, Feb. 27, 1975; Letter from Navy Board for Correction of Naval
Records to the Michigan Law Review, March 7, 1975 [hereinafter Letters]. See also
Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1972). Lunding, supra note 74, at 70-71, states:
"The boards rarely determine legal questions · themselves. Instead each board relies
almost exclusively on the opinions of its service's Office of the Judge Advocate Gen:.
eral. Such reliance reduces 'review' of the legal issue to a futile pro forma exercise"
(footnotes omitted).
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would a court employing traditional mandamus principles find that
the Boards owe a ministerial duty to a convicted servicemember.187
It is even more difficult to maintain that a military official with
clemency powers has a ministerial duty to make record changes.
Use of mandamus in this situation is similar to compelling state
governors to exercise their clemency powers, which few would view
as a proper use of the ·writ. Arguably, however, military authorities
have no right to maintain records of unlawful convictions, and the
correction of such records is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.138 A court employing this reasoning would first decide that
a conviction is unlawful and then hold that the military official
owes a duty to correct it. This argument misconstrues the function
of mandamus. In mandamus proceedings courts should determine
whether -the official whose action is challenged has discretion in
taking that action. If so, courts may review only for an abuse of
discretion; if not, the official's action is ministerial and subject to
mandamus. Courts should not decide on equitable grounds how an
official should exercise his discretion and then state that, in light
of the courts' redetermination, the official's duty is nondiscretionary.
To proceed in this manner would allow federal courts to exercise
137. CJ. Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1970); Carter v. Seamans, 411
F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970); Parrish v. Seamans, 343
F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D.S.C. 1972), afjd., 485 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1973),
138. See Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 331-32 (E.D. Pa, 1973), alfd., 508
F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975). An analogy might be drawn to the recent federal court prac•
tire of ordering the expungement of arrest records maintained by law enforcement
officials upon a de novo determination that the arrest was made without probable
cause or was othenvise in violation of the suspect's constitutional rights. See Menard
v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d
938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (N.D. Okla. 1974); United States v. Dooley,
364 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (expungement will not be ordered when the arrest
was lawful). CJ. Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1974). But cf, Rogers v.
Slaughter, 469 F,2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972) (expungement of record of state conviction
invalidated by federal court in collateral attack under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) should
be left to discretion of state authorities). Since the consequences of an invalid conviction are clearly more severe than those of a simple arrest record, federal courts might
similarly be willing to conduct de novo review of court-martial proceedings for constitutional error.
None of the arrest-record cases, however, involved the review of prior judicial determinations. The arrested plaintiffs were released without trial and without a chance
for judicial scrutiny of their arrests. Moreover, those actions were brought under federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)) or civil rights (28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)) jurisdiction, J!Ot as mandamus actions. The courts were therefore free to employ equitable
standards for granting relief, rather than traditional mandamus principles. Because
of these dissimilarities it is doubtful that federal courts would analogize from the
arrest-records cases to find that military officials owe ministerial duties to expunge
records of invalid convictions,
Additionally, federal courts may be more reluctant to mandamus high military officials than local law enforcement officials over whom courts frequently exercise super•
visory control. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), (b) (order for criminal discovery of
government's evidence); 4l(e) (order for return of property unlawfully seized by government).
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plenary review of all executive and administrative decisions, a result
clearly not the purpose of writs of mandamus.
A few courts have avoided the ministerial-duty limitation by
equating mandamus actions with habeas proceedings and requiring
Correction Boards or military officials to effect record changes whenever error in court-martial proceedings would justify granting habeas
relief to servicemembers in custody.139 Relief may then be granted
whether or not pursuant to a ministerial duty.140 This use of mandamus has rarely been accepted, however, for it substantially distorts
the function of the writ.141
The second limitation on the use of mandamus in this setting
arises from the fact that the Correction Boards effect only sentence
changes and leave untouched the findings and judgments of courtsmartial.142 Even if successful, therefore, the mandamus petitioner is
139. See, e.g., Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 934 (1969). The court spoke in terms of "the plain duty to grant relief' of the
Secretary and the Correction Board, concluding that such a duty existed whenever a
district court would have been obliged to grant a writ of habeas corpus. 395 F .2d at
899.
140. See Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 899 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 934 (1969).
141. The Third Circuit has been precise in disavowing a broad scope of inquiry:
"[I]n considering a petition for a writ of mandamus the district court in these cases
may not look beyond the administrative record. • • • This is so because the issue in
such a mandamus action is whether the Correction Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in view of the record before it." Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261, 263
(1970). Accord, Lima v. Secretary of the United States Army, 314 F. Supp. 337, 339
(E.D. Pa. 1970). But see Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 331-32 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975). The Court in Parrish v. Seamans, 343 F. Supp.
1087, 1094 (D.S.C. 1972), affd., 485 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1973), stated: "Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy ••• available ouly in rare cases as a last resort. Generally speaking, before the writ of mandamus may issue the plaintiff must have a clear right to
relief, the defendant must have a clear duty to act, and there must be no other relief
available."
Most of the decisions involving mandamus requests have been imprecise as to the
standard of review. E.g., United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir. 1972), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Warner v. Flemings, 413 U.S. 665 (1973);
Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Angle v. Laird, 429 F.2d 892 (10th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 918 (1971); Williams v. Froehlke, 356 F. Supp. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd., 490 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974). In recent years commentators have
persuasively argued that cour_ts should be more willing to find the duty requirement
satisfied, and that relief should not be denied simply because close questions of law
are involved. See K. DAVIS, supra note 109, § 23.10 (Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrroN 181-83 (1965); Byse &: Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory•~ Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. REv. 308, 320, 331-36 (1967). Such suggestions have
received scant judicial recognition, however. K. DAVIS, supra, § 23.10, at 806 (Supp.
1970) ("[a]uthority for moving away from the mandamus tradition under § 1361 is
scanty and unsatisfactory"). Two decisions accepting these suggestions are United States
ex rel. Joy v. Resor, 342 F. Supp. 70, 71 (D. Ct. 1972), and Cortright v. Resor, 325 F.
Supp. 797, 812 (E.D.N.Y.), revd. on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972),
142. See Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
879 (1950); 40 OP. AITY. GEN. 504, 508 (1947); Letters, supra note 136. See also Davies,
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left with a federal conviction on his record and the disabilities flowing therefrom.143 Similarly, mandamus would be unavailable to a
convicted serviceman who had served his imprisonment term, if any,
and ,vho had not received a punitive discharge.144
The third limitation is that in mandamus actions only the
records that were presented to the military officials or to the Correction Boards are examined, since that is the only information
relevant in determining whether the officials or the Boards abused
their discretion.140 This limitation is also avoided by the dubious
expedient of equating mandamus actions with habeas proceedings,
because habeas review permits when necessary a de novo inquiry
into the factual basis of alleged court-martial error.146 In sum, although there is precedent for using mandamus to secure nonhabeas
federal court relief from the effects of court-martial convictions,
mandamus is properly limited to a very narrow range of situations.
A second method of nonhabeas collateral attack of court-martial
judgments-an action for declaratory and injunctive relief-was first
prominently tested in 1966. In Gallagher v. Quinn,141 the District of
v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496, 497 (1st Cir. 1968) (dictum}, Cf. Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829,
831 (5th Cir. 1972). For this reason, recent cases have not viewed action by these
Boards as a remedy that must be exhausted prior to federal court review. E.g., Cole v.
Laird, 468 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1972); Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 828,
341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975). See H. MoYER, supra note 36,
§ 6-225, at 1198-201. Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). This conclusion
seems correct, because "[t]he basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an
administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence-to make a
factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 3'1 (19'72}, Accord, McGee v.
United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484-85 (19'71}; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
193-95 (1969). The Correction Boards have little competence to adjudicate constitu•
tional issues and compile no record to simplify judicial review. If exhaustion is re•
quired, its justification must rest on the Boards' capacity to moot judicial controversies
by providing relief. See Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 592-94 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 335 (19'70). The possibility of Board relief need not be exhausted in
the review of Army administrative rulings. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 88 n.3
(1972).
143. See H. MoYER, supra note 36, at 1199: "Thus someone whose petition before
a correction board is completely successful may have all the punitive consequences of
a court-martial removed from his record, but the correction board will refuse, on
jurisdictional grounds, to expunge the underlying conviction itself."
144. See Davies v. Resor, 445 F.2d 1331, 1332 (1st Cir. 1971). In an earlier decision
involving the same petitioner, the court held that to entertain a declaratory judgment
action in such a situation would amount to impermissible direct review of the court•
martial conviction. Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496, 497 (1st Cir. 1968).
145. See Ragoni v. United States, ~4 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 19'70} ("[T]he issue in
such a mandamus action is whether the Correction Board acted arbitrarily or capri•
ciously in view of the record before it.'') (emphasis added).
146. See, e.g., De Champlain v. Lovelace, 510 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 19'75); Conrad v.
Schlesinger, 507 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1974).
147. 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966). The serviceman had
been sentenced by a court-martial to a bad-conduct discharge, but the sentence was
remitted by the Secretary of the Army. The court's reasoning in upholding federal
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Columbia Circuit entertained a suit by a convicted enlisted man who
had received an honorable discharge. The USCMA had denied discretionary direct review. Turning to federal court, Gallagher requested a mandatory injunction to compel the USCMA to hear his
case, challenging on equal protection grounds the statute that gives
the USCMA discretion to hear cases involving enlisted men but
requires it to hear cases involving general or flag officers.148 The
court, presumably reluctant to enjoin the USCMA (over which federal courts have no supervisory authority), interpreted the suit as a
request for declaratory relief. Defending the action, the Government, claimed that federal courts lacked nonhabeas jurisdiction, relying on Supreme Court dictum and lower court holdings.149 The
court distinguished these precedents by noting that none involved a
constitutional challenge to the validity of an act of Congress.150
Because Gallagher did not request review of his conviction, the court
properly ignored article 76. Relief was denied on the merits of the
equal protection claim.
·
While Gallagher received nonhabeas review of an act ~f Congress,
he did not obtain review of his conviction. Most servicemembers
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, however, want declarations
that their convictions are invalid and mandatory injunctions to
expunge all related records. Prior to 1969, federal courts viewed such
suits as requesting impermissible direct review of courts-martial.151
In three decisions beginning in that year the District of Columbia
Circuit Court disagreed. In the first case, Kauffman v. Secretary of
the Air Force,152 the plaintiff requested declaratory relief and restoration to active duty. Relying heavily on Ashe153 and Gallagher, the
court considered only article 76 and concluded unequivocally that it
did not bar nonhabeas review.154 In the second case, Homey v.
court jurisdiction was basically "that unless jurisdiction lies in the District Court in
such a case as this, with appellate jurisdiction in this court and then in the Supreme
Court, the constitutional validity of the Act of Congress cannot be decided except by
the military tribunal." 363 F.2d at 304.
148. UCMJ art. 67~), IO U.S.C. § 867~) (1970).
149. See notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
150. 363 F.2d at 303.
151. See Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 879
(1950); Davies v. McNamara, 275 F. Supp. 278 (D.N.H. 1967), afjd. sub nom. Davies v.
Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1968); Ashe v. McNamara, 243 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass.),
reud., 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965) (see text at note 124 supra); Brown v. Royall, 81 F.
Supp. 767 (D.D.C.), afjd., (D.C. Cir. 1949) (unreported), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952 (1950).
See also Harris v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 228, 230 (D. Mass.), afjd., 308 F.2d 573
(1st Cir. 1962). Cf. Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958), afjd., 274 F.2d
419 (9th Cir. 1959). But see Jackson v. Wilson, 147 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1957).
152. 415 F.2d 991, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
153. See text at note 124 supra.
154. 415 F.2d at 1000. The plaintiff lost on the merits, but even if he had succeeded he doubtless would not have been restored to active duty~ He had been out
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Resor,166 the plaintiff sought a declaration that his conviction was
invalid and a mandatory injunction ordering the Secretary of the
Army to change his records. The court granted relief because of
improper command influence, citing Ashe, Gallagher, and Kauffman
as conclusively establishing jurisdiction.166 In the third case, Avrech
v. Secretary of the Navy, the court's jurisdiction went unchallenged.167 The judgment granting relief was reversed on the merits
by the Supreme Court, however, in a decision expressing uncertainty
about federal court jurisdiction over such suits.168
Other circuits have reached no firm conclusions on whether
servicemembers may challenge court-martial convictions in suits requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit followed the District of Columbia Circuit in a decision that ignored
jurisdictional difficulties.169 While expressing some reservations, the
Third Circuit left the jurisdictional issue unanswered.160 With two
of the service nearly eight years, and in almost all cases courts have been unwilling
to compel the military to take back those unlawfully discharged, See, e.g., Ingalls v.
Zuckert, 235 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1964); Mercereau v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 15'7
(1961). A declaration of invalidity is therefore of little value unless accompanied by
a mandatory injunction directing the correction of the plaintiff's records.
155. 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
156. 455 F.2d at 1348-49.
157. 477 F.2d 1237, 1238 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1973), f'evd. on othef' grounds, 418 U.S. 676
(1974). As a result of his conviction the plaintiff was reduced in rank and briefly incarcerated. He requested a declaration that his conviction was constitutionally invalid
and an order that the conviction be expunged from his record.
158. 418 U.S. 676, 677 (1974). See note II supra.
159. Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (1972). The complaint requesting a writ of habeas
corpus and appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief was filed while plaintiff was
still in custody. Shortly thereafter, the unexecuted portion of the sentence was remitted and the plaintiff was released. In a footnote the court stated: "While this obviously moots the habeas corpus portion of the complaint, it does not change the
underlying fact that Cole continues to have a record of a federal conviction. The re•
maining claims of the complaint were properly within the jurisdiction of the court,
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343, 1361." 468 F.2d at 830 n.l. Despite the release from confine•
ment, habeas would still have been available and on that basis the court could have
granted other appropriate relief. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968);
Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1974). Thus the case is distinguishable
from actions solely for declaratory and injunctive relief. But the above quotation makes
clear that the court concluded that it had the power to review courts-martial collaterally
under its general federal question (§ 1331), civil rights (§ 1343), and mandamus (§ 1361)
jurisdictional statutes,
160. Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261 (3d Cir, 1970). Interpreting the plaintiff's vague complaint "as an attempt to make a habeas-corpus-type collateral attack
on his court martial conviction," the court stated:
Such a right of action by way of declaratory judgment might be available when
habeas corpus is foreclosed because the "in custody" requirement of the habeas
corpus statute cannot be satisfied, Presumably, any action or inaction by the
Correction Board would be irrelevant under any such theory. Moreover, if such a
cause of action were recognized, it would probably allow some factual issues to be
relitigated in the district courts in the manner of habeas corpus attacks on court
convictions.
424 F.2d at 263-64. The court in Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 335-36,
(E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1975), decided that relief other than man•
damns to the Correction Boards was available in the Third Circuit.
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brief, contradictory decisions to its credit, neither including significant jurisdictional analysis, the position of the Second Circuit is
unclear.161 The First Circuit has expressly disavowed jurisdiction,162
but its cursory treatment of the issue occurred prior to Kauffman,
Homey, and Avrech; it is thus unclear whether it will maintain its
position.
While several of these courts discussed article 76," almost none
considered whether there were independent statutory bases for jurisdiction in suits requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Unlike
the habeas corpus and mandamus statutes, the Declaratory Judgment Act163 does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.164
Suits for declaratory or injunctive relief must therefore be based on
one of the general jurisdiction statutes.165 The civil rights statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), does not apply to challenges to federal action,166
and the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act,167 which some courts have construed as a grant of federal court
jurisdiction,168 are specifically inapplicable to courts-martial.169
161. In a per curlam decision, United States v. Carney, 406 F.2d 1828 (2d Cir. 1969),
the court refused to review a court-martial conviction, stating that "the determinations
of the review boards are final and conclusive upon us and we lack jurisdiction further
to consider this matter. See IO U.S.C. Section 876; Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st
Cir. 1968)." The court's citation of Davies v. Clifford seems improper, for that decision stated that declaratory relief was unavailable where the Correction Board already
had granted relief, and not that declaratory (or mandamus) relief was unavailable
when the Correction Board refused to act. See note 162 infra. In United States ex rel.
Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972), revd. on other grounds sub nom.
Warner v. Flemings, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), the court affirmed an order directing the
Naval Correction Board to change the plaintiff's discharge to honorable. The district
court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit was not ~allenged, see 330 F. Supp. 193, 195
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), and there is no indication that the Second Circuit or Supreme Court
gave any thought to the jurisdiction issue. Relying on Flemings, the court in
Williams v. Froehllce, 356 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd., 490 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974)
(relief denied), concluded that the Second Circuit approved of declaratory reliet Accord, Melvin v. Laird, 365 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
162. The plaintiff in Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1968), had his discharge changed to honorable by the Army Correction Board, but sought a declaration
that the conviction itself was void-relief not available from the Board. Arguing that
such a request amounted to direct review of the conviction, the court denied relief,
stating that it had no appellate jurisdiction over courts-martial. The court did not
consider whether declaratory relief would be available when mandamus to the Correction Board was possible, as in Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
163. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1970).
164. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950); Senate
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaigu Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55-56
(D.D.C. 1973). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
165. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[T]he presumption in each instance is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction until it can be shown that a specific grant of jurisdiction
applies."). See generally J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 57.23 (1974).
166. See, e.g., Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 n.l (E.D. Va. 1973).
167. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-06 (1970).
168. See Bard v. Seamans, 507 F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1974); Young v. United
States, 498 F.2d 1211, 1218-22 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Arizona State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ., &: Welfare, 449 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
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Moreover, it is doubtful that the mandamus statute would support
a pendent claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.170
General federal question jurisdiction171 is available to the servicemember advancing nonfrivolous claims of constitutional or statutory
error, even where it is eventually determined that his allegations fail
to state a cause of action.172 Suits based on general federal question
jurisdiction, however, must satisfy the current jurisdictional amount
requirement of $10,000.173 The initial hurdle in meeting this requirement is proving that the right or matter in controversy is capable
of monetary valuation.174 Few quantification problems arise when the
denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972): Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326, 330-31 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Pan Am. World Ainvays, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483,
494 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967); Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918, 919
(10th Cir. 1964); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
366 F. Supp. 51, 58-59 (D.D.C. 1973).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 70I(b)(l)(F) (1970). Arguably, the APA provisions do apply to civil•
ian and military officials in a position to expunge records of convictions. This seems
unlikely, however, for the result would be the liberal review of courts-martial, a result clearly meant to be avoided by the statute. The legislative history of the Admin•
istrative Procedure Act indicates, however, that the exclusion of courts-martial,
military commissions, and military authority exercised in the field in time of war was
to be the full extent of the military's exemption: "Thus certain war and defense
functions are exempted, but not the War or Navy Departments in the performance
of their other functions.'' S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945). The Act docs
apply generally to the military. See, e.g., Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 776 (5th
Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970); Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F.
Supp. 198, 200 (E.D. Va. 1973); Garmon v. Walker, 358 F. Supp. 206, 208 (W.D.N.C.
1973).
170. The plaintiff in Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1970), requested
mandamus and declaratory relief. His request for mandamus to the Correction Board
to change his record was denied because he failed to show that the Correction Board
acted "arbitrarily or capriciously" in denying his claim. 424 F.2d at 263. Concerning
·the plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment, the court noted that declaratory
relief is available only in cases othenvise within the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Federal question jurisdiction was unavailable in this instance because the requisite
jurisdictional amount was lacking. "Moreover," stated the court, "even if 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (mandamus) were available as a jurisdictional basis for a declaratory judgment
action, it is clear that the scope of review in such a case would still be whether the
Correction Board acted arbitrarily in view of the record before it.'' 424 F.2d at 264.
Since the plaintiff failed to make such a showing, the court left unanswered the novel
issue whether nonmandamus relief is available for one successfully showing that a
ministerial duty is due him.
171. The federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1970), provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'' On
· the jurisdictional amount problem, see text at notes 173-79 infra.
172. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 649 (1963); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). On the existence of a cause of
action in this setting, see text at notes 180-92 infra.
173. See note 171 supra.
174. See McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1973); Kheel v. Port of New
York Authority, 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972); Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395,
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matter concerns forfeited pay, fines, or pay lost due to a reduction
in rank. In addition, courts have held that claims of probable diminution of future earnings to the extent of $10,000 satisfy the requirement,176 and should similarly accept calculations of lost veterans'
benefits and pension rights.176 Problems arise, however, where the
plaintiff's sole allegation is the deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights.177 Although there has been some loosening of the
jurisdictional amount requirement when constitutional rights are
at stake,178 it remains generally true that jurisdiction will not lie if
the plaintiff's rights are incapable of accurate valuation.179 The
servicemember who receives a minor sentence and who cannot show
sufficient monetary damage from his felony conviction record is thus
probably foreclosed from declaratory and injunctive relief.
The most serious problem in suits for declaratory and injunctive
relief is the absence of a clearly valid cause of action. Violations by
federal officials of the Constitution or acts of Congress are not redressable under federal question jurisdiction unless the violated
provisions expressly or impliedly created causes of action.180 No
1397 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 F.2d 41
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 {1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 176
(2d Cir. 1969), revd. on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). But see Spock v. David, 469
F.2d 1047, 1057 (3d Cir. 1972); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.),
revd. on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 {2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
175. See Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Schroth v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 n.9 (D. Hawaii 1973); Walsh v.
Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274, 1275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 173 (1886). Cf. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1969)
(capitalized value of future rent reduction allowed).
176. See Hiss v. Hampton, 338 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1972).
177. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972); Goldsmith
v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1397 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
178. E.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.), revd. on other
grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972): "A monetary
price can hardly be placed on the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. • • •
Free speech is almost by definition worth more than $10,000, so that the allegation of
jurisdiction based upon 1331 ought not be subject to denial." See Schroth v. Warner,
353 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Hawaii 1973) (dictum). Cf. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local
Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970), revg. 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), affg. 284 F. Supp.
749 (D. Conn. 1968).
In recent years federal courts have found the jurisdictional amount requirement
satisfied in suits to expunge records of unlawful arrests by the allega~on that siguiµcant damages will result from the distribution of one's arrest record. E.g., Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 960-61
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf. Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972). But see Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J.
1974). Courts similarly may accept allegations of potentially serious damages of uncertain value flowing from an invalid court-martial conviction.
179. E.g., McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2~ 952, 954-55 (4th Cir. 1973); Goldsmith v.
Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1397 (6th Cir. 1970); Shimabaku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp.
825, 826 (D. Kan. 1973). See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972).
180. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 409 F.2d 718, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1969),
revd., 403 U.S. 388 (l~l) (see text at notes 190-92 infra); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d
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common-law cause of action now exists to review court-martial
error,181 and, according to the Supreme Court, "[a]s respects the
creation by the federal courts of common law rights, it is perhaps
needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." 182 Nor are the civil-rights causes of action
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applicable to unlawful federal action.188
Two lines of cases, however, indicate that a federal cause of action
may exist to rectify constitutional errors and jurisdictional excesses
of courts-martial.184 The Supreme Court frequently extends relief
to those injured by acts of government officials in excess of their
express or implied powers.185 The Court stated in Stark v. Wickard 180
that "[t]he responsibility of determining the limits of statutory
grants of authority in such instances is a judicial function entrusted
to the courts by Congress by the statutes establishing courts and
marking their jurisdiction."187 The Court has granted relief in instances where the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply and
where finality provisions purported to limit judicial review.188 This
cause of action redresses only unwarranted exercises of power, however, and therefore will not avail the servicemember who seeks review of nonjurisdictional constitutional error. The servicemember
in this situation may rely on recent cases inferring causes of action
793, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1957); Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
affd., 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963). See also United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
181. See text at notes 88-89 supra. One possible exception is the suit for back pay
in the Court of Claims. See text at note 90 supra.
182. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
183. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973): Roots v. Callahan, 475 F.2d 751 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum): Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449, 451 {8th Cir,
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972); La Rouche v. City of New York, 369 F, Supp.
565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
184. A state cause of action against military authorities may suffice if the essence
of the claim is the unconstitutionality of the federal statute under which the servicemember was convicted. Cf. Smith v. Kansas City Title &: Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
But cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell &: Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933). A state cause of action conceivably could be joined with a colorable request for mandamus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1970) and come within the court's pendant jurisdiction. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528 (1974). If all else fails, the servicemember can claim that the remedy is
an inherent power of federal courts. Cf. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1120, 1125
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) {the expunge•
ment of arrest records held by federal official is an inherent judicial power and not
dependent on express statutory provision).
185. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958); Stark v, Wickard,
321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 621-22 (1912):
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902).
186. 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
187. 321 U.S. at 309-10.
188. See notes 110-13 supra.
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directly from constitutional provisions.189 In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents190 the Supreme Court held that a fourth amendment
violation by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives
rise to a cause of action for damages. Lower federal courts have not
hesitated to extend Bivens beyond the fourth amendment.191 Nor is
the reach of these decisions limited to damage requests, for federal
courts employ any appropriate remedy once a cause of action is
found to exist.1 92
The Court in Bivens suggested, however, that courts should not
infer causes of action when there exists a statutory remedy "equally
effective in the view of Congress."193 Since the deprivation of a
servicemember's rights could have been fully redressed by an acquittal at his court-martial or a reversal on direct review, arguably the
military court system is itself an effective alternative to a constitutional cause of action for nonhabeas relief in the federal courts.
Bivens would be distinguishable under this view because there the
suit was for damages for a violation of the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights, and it is clear that the plaintiff could not have been
awarded the relief he sought in the context of a criminal suit in
which he was the defendant. The servicemember, on the other hand,
seeks only a declaration that his court-martial conviction is invalid
(and the incidents flowing from such a declaration such as return of
back pay and restoration of rank). To extend Bivens to him might
imply, for example, the unlikely result that a civilian criminal defendant not in "custody" also has a cause of action for a declaratory judgment that his conviction is invalid, even though he could have
received the same relief on direct review.194
189. A further possibility is the inference of causes of action from statutory provisions of the UCMJ that implement constitutional rights. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964). Such inference must be consistent with the evident legislative intent, and will not be made when the statute provides for a particular remedy or remedies, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974), or when the omission of a remedy in the statutory framework is deliberate. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959).
190. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
191. See, e.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, No. 74-2370 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1975) (fourteenth amendment); Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, 433 (4th
Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amendment); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146,
1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment); Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir.
1972) (fifth amendment); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 107, 110
(E.D, Pa. 1974) (fifth amendment); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D.
Ill. 1974) (dictum) (all constitutional rights); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp.
1035, 1039-40 (D. Hawaii 1973) (first amendment).
192. E.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d
475, 483 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Dann v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 211 (6th Cir. 1961).
193. 403 U.S. at 397. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1547-50 (1972).
194. See Gajewski v. United States, 368 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 913 (1967).
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If the military courts generally are not as "effective" as federal
courts in the adjudication of constitutional rights, however, federal
courts would be free to infer a collateral cause of action. Alternatively, the "effectiveness" of military review could be made to turn
on whether the servicemember's constitutional claims are fairly considered, permitting the inference of a collateral remedy only where
they are not. This position would respect the congressional decision
to establish a separate military justice system while providing servicemembers with a chance to show that that system has not accorded
them a fair hearing. It should be recognized, however, that the latter
approach may mean that not all servicemembers who suffer the same
constitutional deprivation will be entitled to a cause of action.
A third method of collaterally attacking court-martial judgments
-a back-pay action in the Court of Claims-has been recognized
for a century.195 As with respect to suits for declaratory and injunctive relief, there is here no clearly valid cause of action to review
court-marital proceeding-s. The long history of back-pay suits, however, supports the argument that a common-law action exists that was
not precluded by article 76. While the Supreme Court in 1969 expressly reserved judgment on the validity of this argument,1° 0 dictum
in Councilman suggests that such a cause of action does exist. The
Court of Claims has read article 76 to limit its inquiry in back-pay
suits to issues that "rise to a constitutional level,"107 however, and
in light of Councilman it could well conclude that even a more
restricted inquiry is mandated.198
Since 1972 the Court of Claims has had the general power to order
record changes and restoration to office incident to its power to render money judgments.199 This expanded relief capability and the
absence of a jurisdictional amount requirement might make the
Court of Claims the most attractive forum for the servicemember
seeking nonhabeas review. In two recent suits, the court has entertained claims of servicemembers seeking primarily the expungement
of all record of their convictions, with incidental demands for the
return of small fines. 200 Thus, a claim for a money judgment need
not be the gravaman of the servicemember's compliant.
195. See note 90 supra.
196. See note 11 supra.
197. McDonald v. United States, 507 F.2d 1271, 1277 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Artis v. United
States, 506 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371,
1379 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
198. See text at notes 34-37 supra.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II, 1972), The 1972 amendment gave the court the
power, incidental to granting a money judgment, to "issue orders directing restoration
to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correc•
tion of applicable records ••••"
200. Artis v. United States, 506 F.2d 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ($80 fine); Jones v. United
States, No. 435-73 (Ct. Cl. July 19, 1974) ($40 fine).
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III. PROPOSAIS
The military justice syste~ could be improved by statutory
changes in the jurisdiction of the military appellate courts and the
federal courts reducing the need for, and the uncertainties surrounding, nonhabeas federal court review. The jurisdiction of the Courts
of Military Review and the USCMA is presently limited to cases involving punitive discharge or confinement of at least one year; 201 convictions carrying lesser sentences receive no military appellate court
review. 202 Scrutiny of the latter convictions by experienced appellate
judges would doubtless reduce the number of constitutional errors
reviewed by federal courts and increase confidence in the military
justice system. Automatic review of all convictions, however, would
unduly burden the military appellate courts.203 A suitable compromise would be to amend article 66 of the UCMJ 204 to provide for
mandatory review by the Courts of Military Review of all cases
referred to it by the convening authorities (in addition to all cases
presently subject to mandatory review), and discretionary review of
all other court-martial convictions. The USCMA should retain discretionary review power over all cases decided by the Courts of
Military Review.
Even with this amendment, however, a need would exist for
limited nonhabeas federal court review ·without regard to amount
in controversy.205 Such review should take the form of a single post201. See note 67 supra.
202. See note 67 supra.
203. See note 67 supra.
204. 10 u.s.c. § 866 (1970).
205. The American Bar Association, in its study of aiminal justice, has recommended that:
the availability of post-conviction relief ••• not be dependent upon the applicant's attacking a sentence of imprisonment then being served or other present
restraint. The right to seek relief from an invalid conviction and sentence ought
to exist:
{i) even though the applicant has not yet commenced service of the challenged
sentence;
(ii) even though the applicant has completely served the challenged sentence;
(iii) even though the challenged sentence did not commit the applicant to
prison, but was rather a fine, probation, or suspended sentence.
ABA, PROJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PoST-CONVIcrION REMEDIES, Standard 2.3, at 40-41 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter
ABA PROJEcr]. The accompanying commentary states: "[11his is made necessary by
the application of multiple offender laws which upgrade the authorized or prescribed
sentence for a present offense on the strength of the defendant's prior record. Parole
consideration is likely to be influenced by the number of previous or concurrent convictions. Civil disabilities of more or less impingement frequently continue after a
sentence has been completed." Id. at 43-44. As an alternative to federal court collateral
review of state convictions, it has been suggested that a national court of appeals be
established to review directly state convictions involving federal questions. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 597 (1974). For similar recommendations, see Mayers, Federal Review
of State Convictions: The Need for Procedural Reappraisal, 34 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev.
615, 659-64 (1966).
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conviction procedure with the scope of review limited as recommended above.206 The procedure should grant federal judges the
power to provide full relief-release from confinement, record
changes, return of back pay and fines, restoration of benefits, and
retriaI207-and permit them when necessary to conduct a de novo
inquiry into the plaintiff's court-martial proceeding, as is presently ,
done in habeas corpus actions.208 This would allow sufficient federal
court review without requiring the compilation of a more formal
record in summary and special courts-martial.200 Exhaustion of military remedies should be required, to reduce the number of requests
for federal court review and to minimize federal court interference
with the military justice system.210
It is desirable to establish this review procedure in a single court
for two reasons. First, forum shopping would be virtually eliminated.
Unlike the habeas corpus petitioner, who generally must request
relief in the district of his con.finement,211 the plaintiff seeking de206. See text at notes 65-69 supra.
207. One source of frustration for a number of servicemembers seeking collateral
relief has been the inability to recover back pay in district courts because of the
$10,000 maximum for claims against the government under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C,
§ 1346 (1970). See note 6 supra.
When injunctive relief is unduly coercive, a federal court may turn to the milder
declaratory judgment, the issuance of which does not require that all the traditional
equitable prerequisites for injunctive relief be met. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 462, 471 (1974). Unless the declaratory judgment is to be a mere advisory opinion,
however, the plaintiff may be entitled to a supplementary injunction to enforce it under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (dictum); H.
HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1048 (2d ed. 1973).
208. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Developments, supra note 8, at
1113-53.
209. Requiring a more complete record may be too great a burden on the military.
The multitude of small offenses punished in the military justice system must be
handled quickly and informally. To this end the UCMJ does not require any significant trial record in cases before courts-martial that may not hand out sentences of
punitive discharge or confinement in excess of six months. Trial records are prepared
in general court-martial cases and must be prepared in special court-martial cases if
a bad conduct discharge is to be imposed. UCMJ art. 54, 10 U.S.C. § 854 (1970); MCM,
supra note 24, ,r,r 82-83. If the convening authority is willing to forgo the possibility
of imposing a punitive discharge, it may convene a special court-martial without
compiling a verbatim transcript. See generally H. MoYER, supra note 26, at 577-78.
Failure to prepare a verbatim record when one is required by the Manual for CourtsMartial usually constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 82, 42 C.M.R. 274 (1970). Of the 21,587 persons tried by Army courts-martial
during fiscal year 1972, 28,538 were tried by summary courts-martial and special
courts-martial without the capacity to compile verbatim transcripts. ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 58, at 16. Granting federal courts the power to ronduct de novo inquiries
is essential if these informal proceedings are to be retained.
210. See note 13 supra.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by federal judges "within their respective jurisdictions." Read originally to preclude
federal courts from questioning the confinement of petitioners not within their district, see Ahrens v. Clark, 325 U.S. 188 (1948), the Supreme Court has recently reinterpreted the provision to require only that the issuing court have jurisdiction over
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claratory or mandamus relief may sue in the most receptive forum. 212
Differences among the circuits on the availability and scope of nonhabeas review, the constitutionality of substantive and procedural
military law, and the requirements of exhaustion all encourage
forum shopping. Second, a ~ingle court would become expert in dealing with military law _and with the governmental interests limiting
military due process.213 Ideally the court should be located in the
District of Columbia. That location would of course be convenient
for the government, and inconvenience to the plaintiff servicemember
would not be excessive214 since the military appellate courts from
whose decisions the servicemember would be seeking relief also are
presently located in the capital. Thus, post-conviction review power
could be granted to the District of Columbia District Court or to
the Court of Claims, which has already gained familiarity with military law from its experience with back-pay suits.
The proposed procedure should include a time limit (e.g., one
year), beginning with final disposition of the case by the military,
after which applications for collateral relief would be rejected.
(Exceptions could be made for excusable delay.) Although disabilities flowing from a punitive discharge and a conviction record continue throughout one's lifetime,215 servicemembers must not be
encouraged to wait until retrial becomes impossible before instituting collateral attacks. A time limit would provide finality, increase
the feasibility and accuracy of retrials, reduce record-keeping difficulties, and facilitate thorough post-conviction review by ensuring
that records and witnesses will remain fresh. While the equitable
the custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973). A
collateral attack on a federal sentence must be brought in the sentencing court,
rather than in the district where the prisoner is confined. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
212. Under the general venue provisions, civil actions not involving real property,
in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States acting in his
official capacity, may except as otherwise provided be brought in any judicial district
in which the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1970). Service of process poses little
problem because the several service branches have significant ties to most federal judicial districts.
213. Leading Supreme Court cases developing standards of civilian due process
have stressed that, in determining the procedural rights likely to be adversely affected
by governmental action, a court must weigh not only the seriousness of the harm but
also the countervailing governmental interests. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262-63 (1970); Cafeteria 8: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
214. In Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696-98 (1969), the Supreme Court rejected .an
argument that a convicted servicemember should not be required to exhaust a possible review by the USCMA in Washington, D.C., prior to seeking habeas corpus because of the distance involved. The Court stated simply: "[I]he fact that Captain
Noyd is confined far from Washington, D.C., is not enough, standing alone, to permit
him to circumvent the military court system." The petitioner made no showing that
it was impossible for him to obtain a lawyer willing to present an appropriate and
timely application before the USCMA.
215. See text at notes 71-73 supra.
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doctrine of !aches might accomplish the same ends, courts reviewing
court-martial convictions have thus far shown no inclination to employ it.216
If these proposals for statutory change are not adopted, tw-o jurisdictional extensions could be made judicially to augment intraservice appellate opportunities and to increase the availability and
certainty of federal court review. First, the Courts of Military Review
and the USCMA could expand their jurisdiction under the All Writs
Act to embrace all court-martial convictions. That Act grants congressionally established courts, including these military courts,217 the
power to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions."218 The USCMA at one time indicated that it
could use this power to accord relief to any convicted servicemember,
whether or not his sentence was serious enough to qualify for direct
appellate review, thus minimizing the need for resort to federal
courts.219 Shortly thereafter, however, the court expressly disavowed
the power to expand its jurisdiction in this manner.220 The latter
216. See, e.g., Homey v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (1944 conviction);
Angle v. Laird, 429 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 918 (1971) (1948
conviction); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
934 (1969) (1945 conviction). But cf., Brundage v. United States, 504 F.2d 1382 (Ct. Cl,
1974) (laches invoked in suit for back pay lost through an administrative error). In
eliminating the custody requirement in its proposed standards, the American Bar As•
sociation recommended:
(a) It is unsound to fix a 8l'ecific time period as a statute of limitations to bar
post-conviction review of cnminal convictions. The circumstances that will occasion applications for post-conviction relief are too many and varied to permit
of one useful limitation period.
(b) It should be considered an abuse of process for a person with a tenable or
meritorious claim for post-conviction relief deliberately and knowingly to withhold presentation of that claim until an event occurs which he believes prevents
successful re-prosecution or correction of the vitiating error. An applicant who has
committed such abuse of process may be denied relief on his claim. Courts should
not be required to deny relief in all such cases. Abuse of process ought to be an
affirmative defense to be specifically pleaded and proved by the state.
ABA PRoJEcr, supra note 205, Standard 2.4, at 45. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217. See Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 n.7 (1969). See also United States v.
Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966); United States v. Draughon, 42
C.M.R. 447, 451 (1970).
218. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1970) provides in full: "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law."
219. See United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 11-12, 39 C.M.R. 10, 11-12,
(1968) ("Article 67 does not describe the full panoply of power possessed by this
Court. ••• [T]his Court is not powerless to accord relief to an accused who has pal•
pably been denied constitutional rights in any court-martial; • • • an accused who has
been deprived of his rights need not go outside the military justice system to find
relief in the civilian courts of the Federal judiciary.").
220. See United States v. Snyder, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 483, 40 C.M.R. 192, 195 (1969)
("Our jurisdiction to hear appeals, no matter how well-founded, is set out by Congress
in [UCMJ, art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970)]. We cannot by judicial fiat enlarge the scope
of our appellate review ••••").
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stance accords with the prevailing view that the All Writs Act confers
no jurisdiction.221 Nevertheless, Congress arguably intended the military appellate courts to supervise the entire court-martial system;
while Congress specifically granted them jurisdiction over convictions of a certain severity,222 there was perhaps no negative implication that convictions resulting in lesser sentences were beyond their
supervisory powers. If this argument is accepted, military appellate
courts could entertain petitions for relief from all servicemembers,
although the scope of review under the available writs would be
narrower than on direct appeal.223
The second possible judicial change involves increasing the availability of habeas corpus. Review could be made available to unincarcerated servicemembers who suffer the legal and social disabilities
of punitive discharges by expanding the definition of "custody."224
It is presently well established that a convicted individual is not "in
custody" when he has served his sentence and faces no restraint on
his physical liberty resulting from his conviction.225 Recent cases,
however, suggest that in defining "custody" the Supreme Court is
placing less emphasis on physical restraint and more on the civil
disabilities that attach to convicted persons.226 Arguably, the disabil221. See Commercial Security Bank v. Walker Bank&: Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355
(10th Cir. 1972); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 732-34 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
222. See note 67 supra.
223. The writs are viewed as extraordinary remedies to be used within the sound
discretion of the court. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 735-36
(D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Hayakawa v. Brown, 415 U.S. 1304, 1305 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1974); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Dubnoff v. Goldstein, 385
F.2d 717, 722 (2d Cir. 1967).
224. Kanewske v. Nitze, 383 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1967), held that the recipient
of a bad-conduct discharge was not in "custody'' within the meaning of the habeas
statute.
225. See, e.g., Morgan v. Juvenile &: Domestic Relations Court, 491 F.2d 456, 457
(4th Cir. 1974); Mason v. Anderson, 357 F. Supp. 672, 677 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Downey
v. Cox, 307 F. Supp. 227, 229 (W.D. Va. 1969). See also United States ex rel. Dessus v.
Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972) (suspended sentence not "custody''); Whorley v. Brilhart, 359 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (E.D.
Va. 1973) (habitual traffic offender ordered not to drive on state highways for ten
years-not "in custody"). But see Walker v. Dillard, Mem. Dec. No. 73-1108 (4th Cir.)
(unreported), on remand, 363 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Va. 1973) ($25 fine and 30-day suspended sentence satisfies "custody"); Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 490
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970) (fine or suspension of fishing rights
satisfies "custody'') ("The availability of habeas corpus appears particularly appropriate where the petitioner, although not presently in physical custody, has no other
procedural recourse for effective judicial review of the constitutional issue he raises.'').
226. In Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (habeas petitioner "in
custody" despite his being at large on his own recognizance pending execution of sentence), the Court stated: "Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy ••• its use
has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for
cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.'' 411 U.S. at
351 (emphasis added). The disabilities flowing from a bad-conduct discharge arguably
are "severe" or "immediate" within the meaning of this dictum. The Court suggested
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ities of a punitive discharge sufficiently restrict the servicemember's
social and economic liberty to fall within a definition of "custody"
consistent with the Court's shift in emphasis.
Neither of these judicial changes is likely to be made, however,
for the USCMA has consistently refused to expand its jurisdiction
by issuing extraordinary writs,227 and federal courts in habeas actions
have so far evidenced little inclination to abandon a requirement of
at least minimal physical restraint. 228 Even if accomplished, these
judicial changes would not satisfactorily achieve the goal of the statutory proposals, which is to reduce the number of cases in which federal court review is needed and to provide federal courts with sufficient, but not excessive, power to perform their role in ensuring
that courts-martial employ fair procedures within their constitution.
ally limited jurisdiction.

in an earlier case that restraints are sufficient to constitute "custody" if they "significantly restrain petitioner's liberty to do those things which in this country free men
are entitled to do." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (paroled prisoner
"in custody"). Cf. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). The Jones decision was relied upon by a federal district court that held that a petitioner was in "custody"
despite his having completed his sentence, since "he nonetheless will suffer disabilities and restraints on his liberty as a result of his having been convicted." Glover V.
North Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1969) (noting state prohibitions against
convicted felons entering various professions or holding public office). But see Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1970) (person not in custody after suffering a
fine and revocation of a driver's license); United States v. Flanagan, 305 F. Supp. 325,
326-27 (E.D. Va. 1969) (continuing disabilities sufficient to negate mootness, but not
to establish "custody").
227. See, e.g., Gnip v. Barrineau, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 668 (1973); Osborne v. United States,
21 U.S.C.M.A. 671 (1972). Judge Duncan, however, seems willing to expand the court's
jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, and has dissented from the denial of relief in
several instances. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hamilton, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 664, 664 (1973).
228. See text at note 225 supra. In the two leading Supreme Court cases emphasizing civil disabilities the Court stressed that the petitioners suffered some physical restraint. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963).

